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ABSTRACT 
In August 2016, President Obama directed U.S. Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM) to take the lead in synchronizing Department of Defense (DOD) plans for 
countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD), thus orchestrating a shift in national 
strategy. Under this new role, USSOCOM signaled an intent to increase military efforts 
to identify and prevent proliferation threats from metastasizing into crises. This approach 
represents a turn from USSOCOM’s prevailing emphasis on WMD crisis response. But 
what are the conditions under which military contributions—in collaboration with other 
U.S. government agencies—enhance the national strategy to counter WMD acquisition, 
development, and proliferation prior to a crisis? USSOCOM offers a unique perspective 
in addressing this question, based on its experience synchronizing military 
counterterrorism plans since 2003. This study analyzes USSOCOM’s role in 
counterterrorism strategy and evaluates the application of this experience to counter-
WMD strategy. The research generates two conclusions. First, friction caused by varied 
meanings and understandings of organizational language can be overcome by educating 
the force on language already in use and emphasizing WMD threat pathways as the 
shared calibration point between organizations. Second, USSOCOM can improve 
counter-WMD strategy by replacing rigid command hierarchies with a networked, 
interorganizational response unified around specific threats. 
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LIST OF DEFINITIONS 
Consequence management: “Actions taken to plan, prepare, respond to, and recover 
from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear [CBRN] incidents.”1 U.S. military 
doctrine substituted CM in January 2017 with the term “CBRN response.”2 
Countering weapons of mass destruction: “Efforts against actors of concern to curtail 
the conceptualization, development, possession, proliferation, use, and effects of weapons 
of mass destruction, related expertise, materials, technologies, and means of delivery. 
Also called CWMD.”3 CWMD is used almost exclusively by the U.S. military. 
Counterproliferation: “Those actions taken to reduce the risks posed by extant weapons 
of mass destruction to the United States, allies, and partners. Also called CP.”4 
Nonproliferation: “Actions to prevent the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by 
dissuading or impeding access to, or distribution of, sensitive technologies, material, and 
expertise. Also called NP.”5 
Proliferation pillars: Nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence 
management. Most U.S. government agencies and international partners use these three 
concepts to describe efforts to respond to WMD threats.6 U.S. military doctrine 
discontinued the use of the three proliferation pillars in 2014.7 
Weapons of mass destruction: “Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are chemical, 
biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons or devices capable of a high order of 
destruction and/or causing mass casualties. This does not include the means of 
transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part 
of the weapon. Also called WMD.”8 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In August 2016, President Obama directed U.S. Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM) to take the lead in synchronizing Department of Defense (DOD) plans for 
countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD), demonstrating a shift in national 
strategy.1 Under this new role, USSOCOM signaled an intent to increase military efforts 
to identify and prevent threats from metastasizing to crises.2 This approach represents a 
turn from USSOCOM’s prevailing emphasis on WMD crisis response. But what are the 
conditions under which military contributions—in collaboration with other U.S. 
government agencies—enhance the national strategy to counter WMD acquisition, 
development, and proliferation prior to crisis? More directly, how can USSOCOM help 
do pre-crisis CWMD better? USSOCOM offers a unique perspective in addressing this 
question based on its experience synchronizing military counterterrorism (CT) plans 
since 2003. 
CWMD is not “CT 2.0.” Among other variations, the two cases differ in the 
maturity of current interagency contributions, tempo of operations, and appetite for risk 
acceptance by national leaders. However, prior to the emergence of a WMD crisis, 
CWMD and counterterrorism share strong commonalities—most notably, complexity of 
the threat and necessity for a networked interorganizational response—allowing for 
useful comparison. For this reason, the scope of this research includes only CWMD pre-
crisis, or in what is called the “steady state.” 
This study analyzes USSOCOM’s specific contributions to effective national 
counterterrorism strategy and evaluates the application of this experience to CWMD, 
with special emphasis on the steady state. The assessment of lessons learned from 
counterterrorism and subsequent application to CWMD is divided along two analytic 
categories: “how we communicate about the problem” and “how we organize to address 
                                                 
1 Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, DOD Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction. DOD Policy 
Directive 2060.02 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2017). 
2 United States Special Operations Command: Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
111th Cong., 1 (2017) (statement of General Raymond A. Thomas, Commander USSOCOM). 
xvi 
the problem.” This analysis is supplemented by interviews with interagency and military 
CWMD planners to provide current insight and context for applying counterterrorism 
lessons to CWMD. These interviews include first-hand commentary from representatives 
of the National Security Council, the Department of Energy national laboratories, the 
U.S. intelligence community, academia, and USSOCOM. 
The purpose of this research is two-fold. First, the study draws lessons from 
USSOCOM’s counterterrorism experience to enable policy makers, interagency planners, 
and military leaders to develop a more effective, proactive CWMD strategy. Second, it 
amplifies USSOCOM’s CWMD narrative by providing a consolidated, unclassified 
account of current CWMD language and synchronization efforts. 
A. LEARNING FROM USSOCOM’S COUNTERTERRORISM 
EXPERIENCE 
 1. Overcoming Disparate Organizational Dialects 
Language carves up the world for us. Words provide the medium by which we 
understand and categorize the otherwise infinitely complex into manageable “chunks,” 
which can then be communicated between people and organizations. Within bureaucratic 
institutions, however, conflict arises when meanings are not shared. 
In 2003, no clear consensus existed on the definition of “terrorism,” or by 
extension counterterrorism, between the myriad of interorganizational contributors. 
Instead, variation in organizational language (or counterterrorism dialects) accepted by 
interagency players created competing local realities and friction between organizations.  
Wittingly or otherwise, USSOCOM played a central role in overcoming 
disagreement over counterterrorism language. Though tasked only as the military 
offensive coordinator in 2003, the command recognized the immense value of 
interagency contributors already occupying the mission space and sought to integrate the 
DOD into the broader U.S. government effort. Doing so, however, required overcoming 
the deep-seated language differences that separated counterterrorism entities. Two actions 
contributed to this end. 
xvii 
USSOCOM first educated itself on the counterterrorism language already in use 
by interagency partners. The command drew close to interagency counterterrorism 
partners through daily collaboration and liaison exchanges. In doing so, USSOCOM 
established a better appreciation for the various, unique organizational perspectives and 
the language used to communicate those understandings, similar to the way special forces 
embed into a region to develop cultural expertise and local language proficiency. 
Second, rather than trying to adjudicate dissimilar definitions of the broad 
concepts of terrorism or counterterrorism, USSOCOM leaders initially described their 
efforts through a single, understandable concept: defeating Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), not 
defeating terrorism writ large. USSOCOM essentially sidestepped the contentious debate 
over counterterrorism language by narrowing the discussion to a specific target, where 
defeating AQI represented the initial calibration point around which counterterrorism 
agencies could communicate and collaborate. 
 2. Organizing for Counterterrorism Operations 
U.S. counterterrorism efforts in 2003 resembled a machine bureaucracy that 
promoted process standardization and functional grouping, with centralized leadership 
orchestrating how subordinate groups contributed to the final output. By 2004, this rigid 
hierarchical structure proved ineffective against the complex threat of AQI. Special 
operations task forces played a central role in restructuring counterterrorism into a more 
adaptable, resilient enterprise. 
USSOCOM’s first step did not come in the form of a new action, but rather the 
acceptance of a new reality—comfort as a participant without clear command authority. 
Second, USSOCOM replaced the rigid hierarchical structure with an 
interorganizational network unified around a specific goal: defeat AQI.  
B. APPLYING COUNTERTERRORISM LESSONS TO CWMD 
USSOCOM’s handling of counterterrorism language and organizational design 
supports three recommendations: 
xviii 
 Learn the language(s). The majority of the international community and 
U.S. interagency describe their organizational roles along the three 
“proliferation pillars” (nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and 
consequence management), while DOD uses the construct CWMD. These 
two dialects share many commonalities, but a lack of mutual 
understanding has led to confusion and friction in CWMD interagency 
working groups. Education—within USSOCOM and among partners—is 
the first step in diffusing misunderstandings. USSOCOM liaison officers 
are well situated to advance this effort. 
 Target-focused collaboration. Use specific WMD threat pathways as the 
calibration points to focus interorganizational collaboration. Consensus on 
CWMD language must start with a shared understanding of a clear 
objective. WMD threat pathways represent concrete, limited-scope objects 
around which agencies can collaborate effectively. Analysis of WMD 
pathway choke points and network nodes provides a common point of 
discussion along these lines. 
 Get the word out. USSOCOM is already applying lessons drawn from its 
role as the military counterterrorism synchronizer—comfort without 
command and unity of effort through collaboration—within its new 
CWMD role. USSOCOM leadership has taken steps to reassure 
interagency partners of the respect and value it places on their 
contributions, as well as USSOCOM’s limitations in the CWMD sphere. 
However, many interagency partners still conflate “USSOCOM 
counterterrorism lessons” with military kinetic targeting to defeat terrorist 
networks, rather than organizational changes to improve collaboration. 
The goal is to highlight USSOCOM’s CWMD efforts and amplify the 
“one team, one fight” message. 
Reference 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. WMD PROLIFERATION AS A GROWING THREAT 
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is a persistent threat to 
the United States as well as to its international partners and its interests.1 The threat of 
conflict between nuclear-armed states emerged with the introduction of nuclear weapons 
in the 1940s, and that risk still exists today. Defying international attempts to prevent 
proliferation, North Korea repeatedly challenges regional stability through nuclear tests 
and what Director of National Intelligence James Clapper described as a demonstrated 
“willingness to proliferate dangerous technologies” to other countries, including Iran, 
Pakistan and Syria.2 Both of those states possessed covert nuclear programs. On the so-
called vertical proliferation axis, China is undergoing modernization of its military 
nuclear forces, including advancements in missile technology and increased production 
of its JIN-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines.3 Russia is modernizing its 
nuclear arsenal, has demonstrated interest in shorter range tactical nuclear weapons, and 
reportedly persists in chemical and biological weapons development.4 Despite Iran’s 
legal commitment to the 1970 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the 2015 multilateral 
                                                 
1 Henry D. Sokolski, Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future, 2nd ed. (Arlington, VA: 
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 2016). 
2 The UN General Assembly adopted the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty in 1996, but it has 
not been ratified by all 44 states necessary to enter into force. However, 41 of those states have signed the 
treaty and 36 have ratified it. Nine conferences were held from 1996 to 2015 advocating the treaty’s 
ratification and illustrating the extant international norm of no nuclear testing. North Korea has conducted 
five nuclear tests since 2006 defying this norm. Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence 
Community: Hearing before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Statement by James R. 
Clapper, Director of National Intelligence (Washington, DC: 114th Cong., 2nd sess., 2016), 6–7; Mary 
Beth Nikitin, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments (CRS 
Report No. RL33548) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/
nuke/RL33548.pdf; “DPRK Succeeds in Nuclear Warhead Explosion Test,” Korean Central News Agency 
of DPRK via Korea News Service, September 9, 2016, www.kcna.co.jp/item/2016/201609/news09/
20160909-33ee.html; Siegfried S. Hecker, “What to Make of North Korea’s Latest Nuclear Test,” 38 
North, September 12, 2016, http://38north.org/2016/09/shecker091216/. 
3 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community: Hearing before the House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Statement by James R. Clapper, Director of National 
Intelligence, 7. 
4 Ibid., 7–8; Amy F. Woolf, Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons (CRS Report No. RL32572) (Washington, 
DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=799061. 
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agreement, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, analysts have raised concerns about 
Tehran’s latent nuclear potential, its ongoing missile programs, and the possibility that 
others in the region may react with nuclear programs of their own.5 In South Asia, India 
and Pakistan are ramping up their nuclear arms competition, and many countries are 
stockpiling nuclear materials associated with civil nuclear programs. Iran, North Korea, 
Syria, Pakistan, and others also raise questions about “the possible merging of networks 
dealing in WMD proliferation and terrorism.”6 As USSOCOM takes on new 
responsibilities for CWMD, the global threat is not receding.  
The proliferation challenge has for some time extended beyond the confines of 
interstate conflict. Similar to the way economies have flattened under the pressure of 
globalization in recent decades, non-state proliferation threat networks have become 
increasingly interconnected through a combination of shared interests and opportunism. 
Commercial and private industries produce and trade in chemical, nuclear, and biological 
technologies, many with dual-use qualities affording both legitimate and nefarious 
application. Past research has demonstrated that illicit trafficking and counterfeiting 
networks, largely indifferent to the intent of their clients, support the hidden movement of 
persons, things, and money.7 The emergence of disruptive technologies—including 
chemical and biological microreactors and additive manufacturing—and poorly secured 
state nuclear, chemical, and biological programs have contributed to increased 
                                                 
5 Paul K. Kerr, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status (CRS Report No. RL34544) (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2016), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=793499. 
6 Zachary S. Davis, “Bombs Away,” The American Interest 4, no. 3 (January 1, 2009); Olli Heinonen, 
“Nuclear Terrorism: Renewed Thinking for a Changing Landscape” (Briefing before UN Security Council, 
Open Debate of the United Nations Security Council, New York, NY, February 13, 2017), 
https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/nuclear-terrorism-renewed-thinking-changing-landscape; 
Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community: Hearing before the House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, Statement by James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, 6–7; 
Kerr, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status (CRS Report No. RL34544). 
7 Moisés Naím, Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats Are Hijacking the Global Economy 
(New York, NY: Anchor Books, 2006); Colin P. Clarke, Terrorism, Inc.: The Financing of Terrorism, 
Insurgency, and Irregular Warfare (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2015). 
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accessibility to WMD technologies.8 These factors, combined with a myriad of threat 
actors intent on proliferating, create the potential for WMD threats that span from 
improvised nuclear or radiological dispersal devices employed by terrorist groups to 
nuclear, chemical and biological warfare within the complexity of proxy conflict.9 
Acknowledging the growing threat, President Barack Obama and the 2015 
National Security Strategy name WMD proliferation a top national security priority: 
“Vigilance is required to stop countries and non-state actors from developing or acquiring 
nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, or the materials to build them.”10 Though 
mounting an effective response inherently requires the input and cooperation of many 
government agencies, the Department of Defense (DOD) shoulders some portion of that 
effort. Subsequently, the 2015 National Military Strategy, the 2014 DOD Strategy for 
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD), and military doctrine echo national 
policy guidance on the proliferation challenge.11 
Despite the growing complexity of the proliferation threat and its 
acknowledgement by national leaders, DOD’s contribution to preventing WMD 
proliferation remains largely unchanged, until recently. In August 2016, President Obama 
                                                 
8 Zachary S. Davis, Michael Nacht, and Ronald Lehman, eds., Strategic Latency and World Power: 
How Technology Is Changing Our Concepts of Security (Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory, 2014); Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons (CRS Report No. 
RL34248) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016), https://www.hsdl.org/
?view&did=794655; Olli Heinonen, “Lessons Learned from Dismantlement of South Africa’s Biological, 
Chemical, and Nuclear Weapons Programs,” The Nonproliferation Review 23, no. 1–2 (March 3, 2016): 
147–62. 
9 U.S. National Security Council, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: Office of the President 
of the United States, 2015), 11; Heinonen, “Nuclear Terrorism: Renewed Thinking for a Changing 
Landscape.” 
10 U.S. National Security Council, National Security Strategy, 11; Barack Obama, “How We Can Make 
Our Vision of a World without Nuclear Weapons a Reality,” The Washington Post, March 30, 2016, Online 
edition, sec. Opinion, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/obama-how-we-can-make-our-vision-of-
a-world-without-nuclear-weapons-a-reality/2016/03/30/3e156e2c-f693-11e5-9804-
537defcc3cf6_story.html?utm_term=.714d8e23152d. 
11 CWMD is a DOD construct referring to efforts to respond to the WMD threat. Most U.S. 
departments and agencies use the terms nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence 
management. Chapter II provides more detailed definitions and analysis of these terms. Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015 (Washington, 
DC: Department of Defense, 2015); Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Strategy 
for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2014); Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operation Planning (Joint Publication 5–0) (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 2011). 
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appointed U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) as the lead combatant 
command “for synchronizing planning for DOD CWMD efforts.”12 “Changes to the 
combatant command authorities are not undertaken lightly,” stated Pentagon spokesman 
Gordon Trowbridge following announcement of the transfer of responsibility, “and in this 
case, the change reflects careful consideration of how best to address what is clearly a 
national security priority.”13 
B. LOOKING BEYOND “NINJAS AND NERDS” 
The opening slide of a USSOCOM CWMD joint planning group in early 2017 
read simply, “CWMD ≠ SOF.”14 Initial comments at the forum sought to expose the 
misconception that military CWMD efforts are the principal responsibility of secretive 
teams of “ninjas and nerds,” whereby elite commandos and premier scientists insert in the 
dark of night, on a moment’s notice, anywhere in the world to resolve WMD crises. 
Though some version of this caricature may conceivably exist within the DOD toolkit—
and would serve an inherently critical role in national defense—it does not represent the 
full contribution or potential of military CWMD activities. Unfortunately, within 
USSOCOM, crisis response often receives a significantly disproportionate amount of 
attention relative to its limited role in the larger proliferation response effort. Interagency 
CWMD planning groups suggest that, over time, special operations crisis response 
through direct action has emerged as the dominant characterization of military CWMD 
                                                 
12 The President’s announcement amends the Defense Secretary’s 2005 directive designating U.S. 
Strategic Command the lead command for “integrating and synchronizing DOD in combating WMD.” 
Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Designation of Responsibilities for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction to 
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, January 6, 2005); Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy, DOD Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction. DOD Policy Directive 
2060.02, 10. 
13 Dan Lamothe, “Special Operations Command Takes a Lead Role in Countering Weapons of Mass 
Destruction,” The Washington Post, December 23, 2016, Online edition, sec. Checkpoint, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/12/23/special-operations-command-takes-a-
new-lead-role-countering-weapons-of-mass-destruction/?utm_term=.1d568659b761. 
14 SOF refers to special operations forces. U.S. Special Operations Command J5, “Countering-WMD 
Joint Planning Group” (Presented at USSOCOM CWMD Table-Top Exercise, John Hopkins University 
Applied Physics Lab, Baltimore, MD, 31 January). 
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operations, overshadowing the significant potential effect of efforts to identify and 
prevent threats from metastasizing to the level of crisis.15 
Now directly charged with coordinating DOD CWMD plans, USSOCOM holds 
the appropriate platform to consider the effectiveness of current military efforts on a 
broader scale and propose revisions where appropriate, to include a shift in focus away 
from crisis response to a more preventative posture. Beginning in 2015 and in preparation 
for the pending change in responsibility, USSOCOM began detailed evaluations of 
current military CWMD capabilities.16 These assessments, subsequent joint planning 
groups, and interagency CWMD exercises have consistently emphasized the need to 
expand CWMD shaping operations, specifically military efforts in the “steady state,” 
before the emergence of a WMD crisis.17 
The most recent defense strategy document partitions DOD activities addressing 
the proliferation threat along three lines of effort: “prevent acquisition, contain and 
reduce threats, and respond to crisis.”18 These Defense Department constructs correspond 
roughly with nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management—the 
three “pillars of proliferation” commonly used throughout the U.S. government.19 Steady 
state refers to all efforts short of a WMD crisis, including preventing new acquisitions 
and containing and reducing current threats. Consequence management, inherently 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 5. 
16 U.S. Special Operations Command J5, “Special Operations Forces CWMD Core Activities Plan, 
Version 1.0” (Presented at the USSOCOM CWMD Table-Top Exercise, John Hopkins University Applied 
Physics Lab, Baltimore, MD, 2015). 
17 Ibid.; U.S. Special Operations Command J5, “Countering-WMD Joint Planning Group”; Office of 
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Threat Reduction and Arms Control, “Opportunity Analysis 
3” (Interagency CWMD Exercise, OA3, Herndon, VA, July 25, 2016). 
18 DOD strategy includes a fourth line of effort, “prepare,” which is labeled a “strategic enabler,” and 
is considered integral to all CWMD efforts, regardless of phase. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, 9–12. 
19 The phrase “pillars of proliferation” used here differs from the colloquial expression sometimes 
used to describe the three “pillars” of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: 
nonproliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. DOD CWMD lines of effort and the 
proliferation pillars do not align perfectly, and their differences are addressed in more detail in Chapter IV. 
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
(New York, NY: United Nations, 1970), https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/
uploads/assets/WMD/Nuclear/pdf/NPTEnglish_Text.pdf; U.S. National Security Council, National 
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. 
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triggered by the occurrence of a crisis, does not occur in the steady state and will not be 
addressed directly in this research. Carving CWMD into distinct portions—steady state 
and crisis response—allows for a more detailed analysis of what is required for each. 
 USSOCOM’s history and organizational essence may lead the command to 
recommend DOD simply do more, and do better. However, if USSOCOM’s initial 
assessment of deficits in the steady state holds true, doubling-down resources and man-
power along current lines of effort will do little more to curb pre-crisis WMD threats than 
current efforts by the U.S. government already accomplish. Furthermore, given the 
continually evolving operational environment and contemporary political tendency to 
favor special operations in lieu of conventional military force, USSOCOM will likely 
remain heavily tasked and globally engaged for the foreseeable future. Further 
constrained by looming military funding reductions, neither USSOCOM nor DOD can 
afford to undertake burdensome new operational requirements without proper 
introspection as to what can and should be done. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
In order to contribute to a more complete understanding and ultimately a more 
effective CWMD strategy, this research poses the following question: What are the 
conditions under which military contributions—in collaboration with other U.S. 
government agencies—enhance the national strategy to counter WMD acquisition, 
development, and proliferation prior to crisis? Put more simply, how can USSOCOM help 
do steady state CWMD better? 
Additional nested research questions emerged during the course of this study: 
1. What role does organizational language play in CWMD policy? 
2. How can we overcome challenges in CWMD organizational language? 
3. How does organizational design and structure contribute to (or detract 
from) CWMD efficacy? 
4. What role should DOD—and USSOCOM—play in contributing to an 
effective CWMD strategy? 
 7
D. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is two-fold. First, the study draws lessons from 
USSOCOM’s counterterrorism experience to enable policy makers, interagency planners, 
and military leaders to develop a more effective, proactive CWMD strategy. The lessons 
drawn from counterterrorism in this research are neither original nor do they represent a 
comprehensive checklist for CWMD strategy success. Instead, this research applies a 
balance of theory and practice to illustrate how USSOCOM’s counterterrorism 
experience can help focus near term efforts to address lacunae in the DOD CWMD 
enterprise. Inherently, additional research is necessary to test the assertions presented 
here and to determine their utility for DOD CWMD strategy. 
Second, this research amplifies USSOCOM’s CWMD narrative by providing a 
consolidated, unclassified account of current language used to describe the WMD threat 
and the efforts to counter that threat. During the course of this research, CWMD planners 
(military and interagency alike) consistently raised organizational language as a source of 
friction hindering collaboration. Yet, this study found no repository of WMD 
proliferation terms already in use, nor an analysis of similarities and differences between 
organizational definitions. A complete etymology of WMD language is beyond the scope 
of this research. However, this study consolidates the key terms in common usage at the 
national level, providing a foundation for further, more detailed analysis of WMD 
organizational language in future research. 
E. SCOPE OF RESEARCH AND METHODOLOGY 
In addition to limiting analysis to the steady state, this research focuses only on 
USSOCOM’s charge to synchronize military CWMD planning. Three distinct roles 
characterize the relationship between the CWMD mission and special operations: force 
provider and maintainer; subunified combatant command; and DOD CWMD 
synchronizer.20 
                                                 
20 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations (Joint Publication 3–05) (Washington, 
DC: Department of Defense, 2014), ix–x; Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, DOD Countering 
Weapons of Mass Destruction. DOD Policy Directive 2060.02, 10. 
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USSOCOM units have long served an integral role in counterproliferation 
activities, often participating in crisis response operations due to specialized training 
requirements, readiness to accept operational risks, quick reaction capability, and the 
need to manage dynamic political sensitivities. Authority for these contributions 
originates from 10 USC §167 and the twelve core activities for special operations 
directed by the President and Secretary of Defense—one of those being CWMD.21 To 
provide and maintain a force capable of those activities, USSOCOM organizes, trains, 
and equips special operations forces.22 Theater Special Operations Commands, or 
subunified combatant commands, then employ that force under the operational control of 
geographic combatant commanders.23 Much of the recent literature on special operations 
within CWMD focuses on these two Title 10 roles, and for good reason.24 There is clear 
value in optimizing the preparation for and employment of special operations forces to 
counter WMD through operational preparation of the environment, foreign internal 
defense, security force assistance, and other unique contributions. But, this research 
excludes the two previous roles and focuses instead on USSOCOM’s new duty as a 
military synchronizer. 
To unpack the argument that CWMD efforts in the steady state represent an 
underexplored opportunity and USSOCOM can assist in realizing those improvements, I 
conduct a heuristic case study.25 This theory-building analytical framework will allow a 
detailed analysis of a case study with similarities to the CWMD mission to “inductively 
                                                 
21 “Unified Combatant Command for Special Operations Forces,” 10 United States Code § 167 (1986); 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations (Joint Publication 3–05), x. 
22 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations (Joint Publication 3–05), I-3. 
23 Ibid., III-4. 
24 Lonnie Carlson and Margaret Kosal, Preventing Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation: 
Leveraging Special Operations Forces to Shape the Environment (Tampa, FL: Joint Special Operations 
University, 2017); Craig W. Milliron, “Shifting Focus: Assessing the Role of U.S. Army Special Forces in 
the Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2014), http://hdl.handle.net/10945/42687; Ricardo Estrada, Andrew Kochli, and Paul Minnie, “Cooperation 
Among Nations: Understanding the Counter Nuclear Smuggling Network in Europe” (Master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2016); Ian B. Getzler, “Searching to Enable Global Partners in WMD 
Detection” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016). 
25 Harry Eckstein, Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 1992), 143. 
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identify new variables, hypotheses, causal mechanisms, and causal paths.”26 With so 
many potentially relevant social science and international relations theories intermingled 
in the WMD proliferation field, this research establishes a tailored building block for 
understanding DOD’s approach to CWMD in the steady state. The case study I use for 
comparison is USSOCOM’s contemporary counterterrorism (CT) experience. First I 
identify where counterterrorism and CWMD are most similar—allowing for useful 
comparison—and where they differ. After establishing the comparative value of the two 
cases, I conduct a detailed analysis of counterterrorism “in order to arrive at a preliminary 
theoretical construct,”27 which can then be applied within the context of CWMD.  
I supplement this analysis with personal interviews of interagency and military 
CWMD planners to provide current insight and context for applying counterterrorism 
lessons to CWMD. These interviews include first-hand commentary from representatives 
of the National Security Council, the Department of Energy national laboratories, the 
U.S. intelligence community, academia, and USSOCOM. 
F. WHY COUNTERTERRORISM? 
The nature of this war does not lend [itself] to an easily identifiable 
battlefield. When we call it global, we do not just mean geographically. 
The enemy is operating in the seams of our information structure, our 
financial institutions, and our international political system.  
—General Bryan D. Brown28 
Then Commander USSOCOM, General Brown emphasized the challenges 
presented not only by the evolving threat of terrorism, but also the coordinated 
organizational response required to counter that threat. His 2004 commentary came on 
the heels of the Secretary of Defense’s 2002 directive for USSOCOM to synchronize 
                                                 
26 “Heuristic case study” is one of five types of case study methods offered by Harry Eckstein to 
evaluate social sciences. Ibid., 143–47; Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and 
Theory Development in the Social Sciences, BCSIA Studies in International Security (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2005), 75. 
27 Eckstein, Regarding Politics, 144. 
28 General Brown served as Commander, USSOCOM from September 2003 until July 2007. Bryan D. 
Brown, “USSOCOM Commander’s Intent” (presented at the USSOCOM Commander’s Conference, 
Tampa, FL, 2004). 
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DOD planning for the global counterterrorism campaign and the 2003 announcement 
solidifying that responsibility as a supported and supporting combatant command.29 By 
2003, USSOCOM held the central role in the U.S. defense strategy for countering 
terrorism. However, their new mission came with significant growing pains. From 2003 
to 2006, USSOCOM underwent a significant transformation in the way it did business, 
ultimately emerging as the guiding force of a complex, adaptive network that spanned 
intergovernmental boundaries to counter an equally decentralized threat.30 
Given similarities between the challenge USSOCOM faced in tackling the global 
counterterrorism mission and the challenges associated with global proliferation 
networks, it is my thesis that lessons learned from USSOCOM’s counterterrorism 
evolution hold valuable insights to inform the development of a more effective CWMD 
strategy. Two important shared conditions form the connective tissue of the cases: the 
complexity of the threat and necessity for a networked interorganizational response. 
First, the threats of terrorism and proliferation of WMDs share an uncommon 
level of complexity. This is not to say that other threats to the U.S. and its interests are 
not exceedingly complicated, but rather that the complexity observed in terrorism and 
WMD proliferation surpasses that of many other contemporary defense challenges due to 
their interconnectedness with individual, group, organizational, country, regional, and 
global factors. In 1972, design theorist and University of California Berkeley professor, 
Horst Rittel, published an initial theory on what he called “wicked problems,” 
characterized by socio-cultural complexity and a lack of clear structure.31 Avoiding the 
truism that some problems are just harder, military doctrine adapted Rittel’s theory 
                                                 
29 U.S. Special Operations Command History and Research Office, United States Special Operations 
Command History, 6th ed. (MacDill AFB, FL: USSOCOM, 2008), 15–16; Inside the Pentagon, “SOCOM 
To Function as Both Supported and Supporting Command,” Inside the Pentagon, January 9, 2003, 
https://mail.defensenewsstand.com/inside-pentagon/socom-function-both-supported-and-supporting-
command. 
30 Dale L. Dailey and Jeffrey G. Webb, “U.S. Special Operations Command and the War on Terror,” 
Joint Force Quarterly, Social Science Premium Collection, 40 (January 2006): 44–45; Stanley A. 
McChrystal et al., Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World (New York, NY: 
Portfolio/Penguin, 2015), 242. 
31 Horst W.J. Rittel, “On the Planning Crisis: Systems Analysis of the ‘First and Second 
Generations,’” Bedriftsøkonomen 8 (1972): 390–96; Horst W.J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, “Dilemmas 
in a General Theory of Planning,” Policy Science 4, no. 2 (June 1973): 155–69. 
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through the lens of modern defense, distinguishing what it terms “ill-structured” 
problems through eleven defining characteristics:32 
1. There is no definitive way to formulate an ill-structured problem. 
2. We cannot understand an ill-structured problem without proposing a 
solution. 
3. Every ill-structured problem is essentially unique and novel. 
4. Ill-structured problems have no fixed set of potential solutions. 
5. Solutions to ill-structured problems are better-or-worse, not right-or-
wrong. 
6. Ill-structured problems are interactively complex. 
7. Every solution to an ill-structured problem is a “one-shot operation.” 
8. There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to an ill-structured 
problem. 
9. Ill-structured problems have no “stopping rule.” 
10. Every ill-structured problem is a symptom of another problem. 
11. The problem-solver has no right to be wrong.33 
With even a cursory evaluation, counterterrorism and CWMD fit most—if not 
all—of the qualifiers for ill-structured problems provided in joint doctrine. Terrorists and 
WMD proliferators both include state, non-state, state-proxy, and commercial actors. 
Terrorism networks and WMD proliferation networks routinely pursue their objectives by 
exploiting ungoverned spaces and gaps in national defenses, circumventing international 
boundaries and intergovernmental jurisdictions. The global nature of both threats evinces 
significant overlap of functional and regional issues. 
Given the complexity of the threat, it naturally follows that counterterrorism and 
CWMD share a second commonality: countering the threat necessitates a networked 
organizational response. Military leaders have long emphasized the importance of 
interorganizational collaboration, defined in joint doctrine as “the interaction that occurs 
                                                 
32 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design 
(TRADOC Pamphlet 525–5-500) (Fort Monroe, VA: Department of the Army, 2008), 9–11. 
33 Ibid. 
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among elements of DOD; engaged U.S. government (USG) agencies; state, territorial, 
local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; IGOs; 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); and the private sector for the purpose of 
accomplishing an objective.”34 The foundational document on military planning uses the 
term interorganizational seventeen times, and an entire publication has been dedicated to 
guide “the translation of national objectives into unified action” across organizations.35  
However, formulating an effective interorganizational response to terrorism and 
WMD proliferation requires more than planning and coordination between entities; it 
requires a truly networked response. The opening chapter of the 2013 SOF Interagency 
Counterterrorism Reference Manual emphasizes this point in the context of terrorism: 
The line of departure for any discussion of the interagency process is a 
shared awareness that no single department, agency, or organization of the 
United States Government (USG) can, by itself, effectively locate and 
defeat terrorist networks, groups, and individuals. Similarly it has become 
increasingly evident that it is not possible for individual countries, 
coalitions, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) to “go it alone” against the threats posed by 
terrorists and their networks.36 
CWMD requires the same level of—or, as this research will argue, even more—
interorganizational cooperation than that required for counterterrorism. Nearly every U.S. 
government department holds some equity in one or more of the proliferation pillars, and 
each of those to some degree rely on inputs or capabilities provided by nongovernmental 
organizations, commercial industry, and international partners. Though additional 
research has since challenged that it fails to capture the true complexity of players 
involved, a 2009 study (depicted in Figure 1) identified more than 143 U.S. government 
                                                 
34 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operation Planning (Joint Publication 5–0), xviii. 
35 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operation Planning (Joint Publication 5–0); Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Interorganizational Cooperation (Joint Publication 3–08) (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 2016). 
36 Joint Special Operations University, Special Operations Forces Interagency Counterterrorism 
Reference Manual, 3rd ed. (MacDill AFB, FL: The JSOU Press, 2013), 1–1. 
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entities responsible for counterproliferation alone, with no mention of essential civilian or 
international partners:37 
 
Figure 1.  2009 U.S. Counterproliferation Organizational Chart38 
However, CWMD is more than “counterterrorism 2.0.” This statement may 
appear obvious, but it is a critical point if we are to avert blindly applying USSOCOM’s 
counterterrorism methods, which worked well under a specific set of conditions, to 
CWMD. International conflict historian, Zachary Shore, warns against the tendency to 
cling to idealized best examples of strategy. In the face of complex, ill-defined problems, 
military leaders must remain cognizant of what Shore terms the cognitive trap of cure-
                                                 
37 William T. Cunningham et al., “Too Big to Fail: The U.S. Government Counter Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Enterprise” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014), xv–xix; Anna Loukianova, 
“Principle U.S. Government Agencies Combating Nuclear Proliferation,” James C. Martin Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies, February 18, 2009, http://www.nonproliferation.org/research/pdf_support/
090213_wmd_chart.pdf. 
38 Source: Loukianova, “Principle U.S. Government Agencies Combating Nuclear Proliferation.” 
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allism, “an almost religious belief in a theory’s universal applicability.”39 It follows that 
USSOCOM faces inherent risk in trying to force an optimized solution for a specific 
problem (counterterrorism) onto a new and different challenge (CWMD in this case). The 
previously successful strategy for counterterrorism offers utility in addressing the new 
problem in many ways, but should be attempted only after properly acknowledging the 
shared or dissimilar conditions under which each occurs. 
For example, USSOCOM is assuming the role of military synchronizer in a more 
mature mission-space than it did in 2003. Prior to USSOCOM’s entrance in either case, 
counterterrorism and CWMD held storied histories that included numerous interagency 
contributors along multiple lines of effort. But, within some areas of CWMD, 
interorganizational partners have been entrenched in clearly defined, specialized roles—
some dating back as early as the 1940’s and the Manhattan Project. Preventing and 
countering the proliferation of nuclear technology has been a priority since the early days 
of the atomic age. Likewise, the proliferation dangers of chemical and biological 
weapons have been the focus of national and international efforts for many decades. 
Further, the tempo of operations required to counter terrorism and WMD threats 
differ in many cases. U.S. counterterrorism strategy since 2003 has followed a pattern of 
frequent, rapid application of kinetic force. Counterterrorism task forces in Iraq, for 
example, dismantled terrorist networks through persistent targeting, often conducting 
numerous military raids in a single night.40 However, this relentless targeting pattern 
differs from that of CWMD operations. National Security Council Director of WMD 
Terrorism Threats, Dr. Robyn Klein, describes the duality of the CWMD operational 
tempo as mostly steady and deliberate in nature, but occasionally demanding rapid 
acceleration for short periods. 
WMD threats are often complex, technical, long-evolving, and/or 
compartmented challenges that can require committed efforts over a long 
time horizon to develop the necessary understanding, opportunities, and 
approaches to address them. Among the key differences from other types 
                                                 
39 Zachary Shore, Blunder: Why Smart People Make Bad Decisions (New York, NY: Bloomsbury, 
2009), 107. 
40 McChrystal et al., Team of Teams. 
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of operations, CWMD operations often include a technical component that 
requires specialized expertise and approaches, which could result in a 
slowed tempo for any response. WMD also can pose a significant threat to 
life or property, which in some cases may accelerate efforts.  Further, 
actors seeking to acquire or produce WMD may rely on dual-use 
equipment or other materials that can be difficult to track and thus will 
require entrenched efforts over time. All of this suggests that CWMD 
requires capabilities and commitment to address long-term and fast-
emerging threats...41 
Measured against the rapid pace of counterterrorism, CWMD operations follow a 
comparatively slower pattern overall, with infrequent and narrow opportunities to 
respond to threats. Among other constraints, CWMD operations are arrested by the 
commercial nature of WMD networks, acquisition of dual use goods, various authorities 
required to act, and the time required to develop and deploy complex technical systems.42 
Some have suggested, for example, North Korean nuclear proliferation is “the Cuban 
missile crisis in slow motion”43 
USSOCOM CWMD planner, Rob Foster, describes the contrast between 
counterterrorism and CWMD in this way: “Tempo lends itself to capacity and the ability 
to mass capability. The deliberate nature of most state and non-state WMD programs is 
many times slower, with a longer time horizon than that of other threats. ”44 Foster goes 
on to describe how the measured pace of CWMD operations in the steady state can 
change suddenly after long periods of low activity. “This creates space for decision 
making, but also creates risk for missed opportunities and ‘losing the ball.’”45 
 Lastly, terrorist attacks against the U.S. and its interests account for thousands of 
deaths and millions in damage, while WMD’s have claimed comparatively few U.S. 
                                                 
41 Robyn Klein (Director, WMD Terrorism Threats, The White House National Security Council), in 
discussion with the author, May 9, 2017. 
42 Zachary Davis (Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory), in 
discussion with the author, May 20, 2017. 
43 David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “U.S. Faces A ‘Cuban Missile Crisis in Slow Motion,’” The 
New York Times, April 17, 2017, New York edition, sec. Politics. 
44 Robert D. Foster, Jr. (Pathway Defeat Strategic Planner, USSOCOM J53 Special Plans & Policy), in 
discussion with the author, April 17, 2017. 
45 Ibid. 
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lives. The reason for the lack of WMD use is much debated, but its nonoccurrence is 
undeniable. Even including chemical weapon use in Syria, the WMD threat to the U.S. 
homeland appears less urgent than that of counterterrorism by comparison. In this way, 
policy makers and strategists understandably catalogue counterterrorism as an easily 
visible, extant danger while WMD use remains a high consequence but low probability 
event. 
G. RELEVANT LITERATURE 
Bodies of knowledge relevant to this study correspond to the two analytic 
categories that will be used to evaluate CWMD—the significance of organizational 
language and the maturation of collaborative networks. 
1. Organizational Language 
Although we inadvertently traffic in communication by means of the written 
word, we have been blissfully inattentive to the rhetorical manner in which 
language works to stabilize meanings that we then uncritically mobilize in 
our attempts to persuade others to our point of view. 
—Robert Chia and Ian King46 
Language carves up the world for us. Words provide the medium by which we 
understand and categorize the otherwise infinitely complex into manageable “chunks,” 
which can then be communicated from person to person. Further, where language plays a 
critical role in the interaction between individuals, it plays an equal—or arguably greater—
role in the interactions within and between groups of people, or organizations. Social 
psychologist Kenneth Gergen asserts that “our theories of organization are, first and 
foremost, forms of language. They are guided by existing rules of grammar, and 
constructed out of the pool of nouns and verbs, the metaphors, the narrative plots and the 
like found within the linguistic context.”47 
                                                 
46 Robert Chia and Ian King, “The Language of Organization Theory,” in The Language of 
Organization, ed. Robert Westwood and Stephen Linstead (London, England: Sage, 2001), 312. 
47 Kenneth J Gergen, “Organization Theory in the Postmodern Era,” in Rethinking Organization: New 
Directions in Organization Theory and Analysis, ed. M. I. Reed and Michael Hughes (London, England: 
Sage Publications, 1992), 207. 
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However, because “all observers are not necessarily led by the same physical 
evidence to the same picture of the universe,” effective communication within an 
organization requires individuals to establish some level of unanimity on how to describe 
important concepts.48 Where consensus can be formed on the verbal expression of ideas, 
those specific words or phrases “come to form the instinctively shared calibration points for 
defining local reality.”49 But, that reality is truly local. The agreed meanings reached do 
not naturally extend beyond the boundaries of that organization. Instead, as cultural linguist 
Benjamin Lee Whorf explains, “We cut nature up, organize it into concepts, and ascribe 
significances as we do, largely because we are parties to an agreement to organize it in this 
way—an agreement that holds throughout our speech community and is codified in the 
patterns of our language.”50 
Unsurprisingly, language plays a central role in how various players understand and 
interact with one another to counter WMD threats. Is there an accepted definition of 
WMD? Who is responsible for implementing nonproliferation and counterproliferation 
policy? Should nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and military CWMD strategies be 
developed independently? Each of these questions depend upon shared (or dissimilar) 
meanings of the threats, players, and responses to the policy objectives. How we define 
these concepts influences the communication between and synchronization of disparate 
interorganizational bodies towards a unified national strategy. But, achieving a unity of 
effort may not require a universal language. After all, international partners successfully 
address complex problems daily, despite linguistic and dialectal barriers. 
2. Collaboration and Organizational Design 
Much literature has been written on the necessity and challenge of collaborating 
to meet national defense threats. At the broadest level, any attempt to modify existing 
national security programs will face the traditional bureaucratic challenges of conflicting 
organizational interests, Congressional budget restrictions, and a general aversion to 
                                                 
48 Chia and King, “The Language of Organization Theory,” 312. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Emphasis added. Benjamin Lee Whorf, “Science and Linguistics,” MIT Technology Review 42, no. 
6 (April 1940): 231. 
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change in the system.51 Though interorganizational collaboration has improved within 
specific mission spaces such as counterterrorism, USSOCOM’s assignment to integrate 
military efforts into broader, ongoing nonproliferation and counterproliferation constructs 
must overcome reluctance by some—both within DOD and other agencies—to share 
information and embrace a true whole-of-government strategy.52 Beyond establishing an 
American unity of effort, the integration and leverage of international military partners to 
prevent WMD proliferation remains notably lacking.53 The evolution of U.S. 
counterterrorism strategy by 2007 demonstrated the combined strength and agility of a 
networked organization of interorganizational partners, providing a starting point for 
developing solutions to problems under similar conditions.54 
 
                                                 
51 Morton H. Halperin, Priscilla Clapp, and Arnold Kanter, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, 
2nd ed (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006); Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense 
(New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1961). 
52 Davis, “Bombs Away”; Cunningham et al., “Too Big to Fail: The U.S. Government Counter 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Enterprise”; Derek W. Lothringer et al., “Countering Weapons of Mass 
Destruction: A Preliminary Field Study in Improving Collaboration” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2016), http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/48551. 
53 Estrada, Kochli, and Minnie, “Cooperation Among Nations”; Getzler, “Searching to Enable Global 
Partners in WMD Detection”; Milliron, “Shifting Focus.” 
54 McChrystal et al., Team of Teams; Joint Special Operations University, Special Operations Forces 
Interagency Counterterrorism Reference Manual. 
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II. USSOCOM LESSONS FROM COUNTERTERRORISM 
We can’t control everything, but we can control how we organize, 
communicate, and operate. 
—Dr. John Arquilla1 
Most agree that USSOCOM played an important role in forming American 
counterterrorism strategy. But, what are the true “lessons” of the counterterrorism 
evolution? What, specifically, did USSOCOM contribute to effect positive change? 
USSOCOM adopted several practices that significantly improved its effectiveness in 
counterterrorism at the tactical and operational levels, to include an aggressive targeting 
process and the delegation of responsibility lower in the command structure.2 But, despite 
their value, these lessons do not inform the proper conduct of USSOCOM in its role as 
military synchronizer at the combatant command level. 
In order to draw the correct lessons that hold utility for USSOCOM’s CWMD 
role, this chapter remains firmly focused on USSOCOM’s actions from the capacity of 
global synchronizer for counterterrorism military plans. These contributions can be 
broadly sorted by how USSOCOM communicated about and organized for 
counterterrorism operations.   
A. THE LANGUAGE OF COUNTERTERRORISM 
1. Counterterrorism: What’s in a Name? 
By September, just a year after the turn of the century, terror struck the United 
States. Before the fatal attack that drew the attention of the world, Americans citizens and 
leaders largely understood terrorism as a foreign problem; threatening interests abroad, but 
representing no real danger to the homeland. However, the murder of innocent civilians by 
terrorists yielding knives, guns, and explosives introduced America to a new reality. At the 
height of this violence, the assassination of President William McKinley in September 
                                                 
1 Quoted in Lothringer et al., “Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 2. 
2 Christopher Lamb, “Global SOF and Interagency Collaboration,” Journal of Strategic Security 7, no. 
2 (Summer 2014): 10, 13–14; McChrystal et al., Team of Teams, 209–19. 
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1901 “shattered American complacency” and ushered in the “war against anarchist 
terrorism.”3 Addressing Congress for the first time in December of that year, President 
Theodore Roosevelt called the nation and the international community to join together to 
meet the threat of terrorism: “Anarchy is a crime against the whole human race; and all 
mankind should band against the anarchist.”4 
One-hundred years later, the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and other 
incidents—resulting in far greater deaths and strategic impact than the 1901 attacks—
spurred similar sentiment to leverage all available tools of national power against terrorism. 
A broad array of interagency players contributed to counterterrorism, applying the 
instruments of U.S. national power, commonly categorized by “diplomatic, information, 
military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement components.”5 Over time, 
their collective lexicon and actions began to codify the definitions of terrorism and 
counterterrorism. A language for countering terrorism was forming—or rather, evolving. 
Terrorism and its policy cousin, counterterrorism, are not 21st century concepts. 
Unsurprisingly, the language used to describe the threat and response are equally storied 
and varied. Though the act of terrorism and its definitions extend throughout the length of 
recorded history, we will limit the scope of our focus to the emergence of “modern terror,” 
attributed to Russian anarchists in the 1880s.6  
Even within this narrower history, however, some contend that the language still 
lacks clarity, and “the search for an adequate definition of terrorism is still on.”7 Historian 
Alex Schmid’s 1984 study identified 109 distinct definitions of terrorism, formed through 
                                                 
3 R. Jensen, “The United States, International Policing and the War against Anarchist Terrorism, 
1900–1914,” Terrorism and Political Violence 13, no. 1 (2001): 15. 
4 Theodore Roosevelt, President Theodore Roosevelt’s Message to the Senate and House of 
Representatives (Washington, DC: 57th Cong., 1st sess., 1901), 82. 
5 Joint Special Operations University, Special Operations Forces Interagency Counterterrorism 
Reference Manual, I-3. 
6 David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” in Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a 
Grand Strategy, ed. Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes (Washington, DC: Georgetown University 
Press, 2004), 46–73. 
7 Alex Peter Schmid and A.J. Jongman, Political Terrorism, Revised (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers, 2005), 1. 
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the varied combination of twenty-two qualifiers, ranging from the use of violence to the 
victimization of innocent civilians.8 Caleb Carr emphasizes the centrality of civilian 
targeting more specifically through an extensive historical survey of terrorism, what he 
terms “deliberate warfare against civilians.”9 Hoffman later challenged the assertion of the 
“victim” or “target audience” as the defining feature of terrorism, positing that the 
definition must expand to account for the actor—state terrorists and revolutionaries, for 
example—and their motivations—political change and religious ideology, for example.10 
More contemporary academic commentary focuses on describing the nature of terrorism 
and its ideologies, to include Rapoport’s expanding and contracting wave construct and 
later challenged by Parker and Sitter’s theory of terrorism as contagious strains of an 
infectious disease.11  
If the search net is cast wide enough to include academia, mainstream media, and 
general public dialogue, then characterizing a widely-accepted definition of terrorism 
seems unmanageable. However, though these communication mediums influence political 
discourse to some degree, they do not inherently represent the dialect within the 
government. Instead, the government’s construction of terrorism derives principally from 
two sources: “linguistic representations expressed by political leaders and counterterrorism 
officials” and the actions and practices carried out in the name of those expressions.12 
Hoffman compiled the definitions used in 2002 by several key government entities, 
demonstrating how the language of terrorism employed by U.S. officials remained largely 
divided. 
The U.S. State Department, for example, uses the definition of terrorism 
contained in Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d): 
                                                 
8 Ibid., 5. 
9 Caleb Carr, The Lessons of Terror. (New York, NY: Random House, 2002), 6.  
10 Ibid., 1–2; Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Rev. and expanded ed (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 2006), chap. 1. 
11 Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” 47; Tom Parker and Nick Sitter, “The Four 
Horsemen of Terrorism: It’s Not Waves, It’s Strains,” Terrorism and Political Violence 28 (2016): 197–
216. 
12 Richard Jackson, “Culture, Identity and Hegemony: Continuity and (the Lack of) Change in U.S. 
Counterterrorism Policy from Bush to Obama,” International Politics 48, no. 2/3 (2011): 392. 
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“premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually 
intended to influence an audience… We also consider as acts of terrorism 
attacks on military installations or on armed military personnel when a state 
of military hostilities does not exist at the site, such as bombings against 
U.S. bases in Europe, the Philippines, or elsewhere.” 
The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines terrorism as “the 
unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate 
or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in 
furtherance of political or social objectives,” 
while the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) states that terrorism is 
“an activity that involves an act that: is dangerous to human life or 
potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources; and… must 
also appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; 
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or 
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, 
assassination, or kidnapping.” 
And the U.S. Department of Defense defines it as “the calculated use of 
unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended 
to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals 
that are generally political, religious, or ideological objectives.”13 
Variations in these definitions corresponded mostly with the organizational 
interests, perspectives, and authorities of the government entities they represented. The 
State Department characteristically underscored politics and sub nationalism as key tenets 
of terrorism. The FBI approached the topic from a lens of legality and adjudication. 
Protecting critical infrastructure and resources reflected the DHS’ mission focus as the 
domestic protectorate. The Defense Department’s definition represented the broadest 
interpretation, providing qualifiers for the threat, the effect, and the motivation of 
terrorism.14 In effect, each agency demonstrated their commitment to the national policy of 
counterterrorism—or at least the broader strategic narrative that terrorism must be 
countered—through official language and resulting practices, but no consensus existed on 
exactly what was to be countered or how to organize efforts into a unified strategy. 
                                                 
13 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 30–31. 
14 Ibid. 
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2. Overcoming Disparate Organizational Language 
Within the bureaucratic construct, language and organizations become so 
intertwined that “the problems of organization theory are essentially problems in the use of 
words.”15 As shared meanings become more accepted within an organization, language 
assumes a more dominant role, even blurring the lines between structure and agency. Both 
the organizational design (or its “structure”) and the actions of individuals belonging to that 
organization (their “agency”) begin to reflect the shared meanings subscribed to by that 
organization.16 As a result, the language accepted by an organization even influences that 
organization’s essence: 
Indeed, oftentimes we are very much at the mercy of that particular form of 
language which has become the common medium of expression for our own 
collectivity, so much so that the language habits of our community 
unconsciously predispose us to certain preferred choices of interpretation.17 
In the case of counterterrorism, variation in organizational language accepted by 
interagency players created competing local realities and friction between organizations. 
French philosopher Michel Foucault explains that such conflict originates from “power-
knowledge” positions, and from those positions organizations can leverage discourse as a 
tool to exercise power over one another.18 As consensus on language within each 
organization grows and meanings solidify further, ontological variations between 
organizations become more acute, strengthening the power that disparities in the language 
impart: “To the extent that meanings become fixed or reified in certain forms, which then 
articulate practices, agents and relations, this fixity is power. Power is the apparent order of 
                                                 
15 Lloyd Sandelands and Robert Drazin, “On the Language of Organization Theory,” Organization 
Studies 10, no. 4 (1989): 474. 
16 Graham Sewell, “The Prison-House of Language: The Penitential Discourse of Organizational 
Power,” in The Language of Organization, ed. Robert Westwood and Stephen Linstead (London, England: 
Sage, 2001), 177. 
17 Chia and King, “The Language of Organization Theory,” 312. 
18 Michel Foucault and Colin Gordon, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 
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taken-for-granted categories of existence, as they are fixed and represented in a myriad 
discursive forms and practices.”19 
Moreover, the ambiguity of the language around which these organizations 
disagreed—counterterrorism in particular—further hindered any attempt at reaching 
consensus of meaning between organizations. Useful verbal constructs “need not refer to 
something observed,” explains organizational theorists Lloyd Sandelands and Robert 
Drazin, but “they must at least refer to something. Behind them must stand a definite object 
or event of some kind. Where this minimum criterion is not met, words denote non-existent 
(unreal) objects or events.”20 Terrorism certainly passes this litmus test, ultimately 
manifested as acts of terrorism that can be observed. However, counterterrorism is less 
concrete. Individual acts of counterterrorism could be observed, such as arresting a terrorist 
or defusing an explosive device. But, the broader concept of counterterrorism, if meant to 
denote a combined, organized USG effort, arguably did not exist in 2003. Agencies and 
bureaus conducted activities under the auspice of counterterrorism, but principally only 
through their organizational perspective and agnostic to the efforts of other agencies. 
Rather than providing clarity and points of collaboration, the term “counterterrorism” 
served to “instead mystify the process in a welter of misbegotten abstractions and 
unauthentic processes” and “portray an unreal world where organizing appears to be 
explained, but is not.”21 
In The Lessons of Terror, military historian Caleb Carr summarizes the American 
state of affairs and challenge of describing terrorism and counterterrorism by 2002: 
“Confusion and arguments over terms and concepts, goals and strategies, have hampered 
the prosecution of America’s response from the start. The costs of this confusion are 
apparent, the reasons behind it less so.”22 
                                                 
19 Stewart Clegg, Frameworks of Power (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1989), 183. 
20 Sandelands and Drazin, “On the Language of Organization Theory,” 458. 
21 Ibid., 458, 472–73. 
22 Carr, The Lessons of Terror, 9. 
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Given the disparate definitions and resulting bureaucratic conflict, how then, did 
these various organizations come together to form what most consider today to be a highly 
effective national counterterrorism strategy? 
Enter USSOCOM in 2003, appointed as DOD’s new counterterrorism offensive 
coordinator. Wittingly or otherwise, USSOCOM played a central role in overcoming the 
challenges of language in counterterrorism. Though tasked only with coordinating military 
efforts to counter terrorism, the command recognized the immense value of interagency 
contributors already occupying the counterterrorism mission space and sought to integrate 
DOD into the broader USG effort.23 Doing so, however, required overcoming the deep-
seated language differences that separated counterterrorism entities. Two specific actions 
contributed to this end. 
First, USSOCOM educated itself on the counterterrorism language already in use 
by interagency partners—a sort of assessment phase. In 2003, special operations task forces 
significantly increased their practices of incorporating interagency partners in military 
command centers, embedding liaison officers within other agencies, and promoting 
unprecedented information sharing.24 Though principally aimed at improving 
interorganizational collaboration, these initiatives also allowed USSOCOM to develop a 
familiarity with the common practices and language within the other organizations through 
close, daily interaction. Similar to the way Special Forces embed into a region to develop 
cultural understanding and local language proficiency, USSOCOM drew close to 
interagency counterterrorism partners and in doing so established a better appreciation for 
the various, unique organizational perspectives and the language employed to communicate 
those understandings. 
Of note here is what USSOCOM did not do to resolve the language conflict. 
Faced with the conflicting objectives of promoting a unified interagency response and 
overcoming disparate organizational language, special operations could have directly 
confronted the friction by establishing its own “knowledge-power” position in 
                                                 
23 McChrystal et al., Team of Teams, chap. 6. 
24 Ibid., 161–71. 
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conjunction with its new counterterrorism role. Yet this study finds no evidence that 
USSOCOM took deliberate steps—such as imposing homogeneity or assuming the role 
of translator between organizations—to participate in the ongoing bureaucratic struggle 
over language. 
Instead, USSOCOM narrowed the scope of its focus through a second 
contribution: special operations task forces in Iraq described their efforts through a 
single, understandable concept— “defeating AQI.”25 To be clear, USSOCOM did not 
create the verbal construct or idea of dismantling AQI. Rather, the Secretary of Defense 
directed the command to target terrorist networks, and AQI represented the most relevant 
threat at the time. However, rather than attempting to rectify disparate language between 
partnered agencies over the broader concepts of terrorism or counterterrorism, special 
operations sought to form consensus on the specific target and requisite response to 
countering it. This consensus was not formed through force, though. Instead, the special 
operations task forces simply adopted the narrow target-focus themselves and then 
invited interagency partners to come alongside in that effort through collaboration. In 
doing so, “defeating AQI” came to represent the primary shared calibration point 
between contributing organizations.26 USSOCOM essentially sidestepped the contentious 
debate over counterterrorism language by narrowing the discussion to a specific target. 
B. ORGANIZING FOR COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS 
Despite the friction generated by disparate organizational language, the USG—
including military forces synchronized by USSOCOM—eventually formed and executed 
an effective counterterrorism response capable of meeting the rising threat.27 
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Understanding that success requires a more detailed analysis of how USSOCOM 
and the larger USG construct organized to counter terrorism. Until the last few years, few 
unclassified sources documented USSOCOM’s role in the successful evolution of 
counterterrorism, but a growing body of literature has emerged, spurred largely by the 
memoirs of General Stanley McChrystal.28 Expanding on those accounts, this chapter 
identifies two specific conditions that contributed to counterterrorism effectiveness in 
Iraq (causal mechanisms) and the subsequent results of those actions (causal effects).29 
1. Comfort without Command 
USSOCOM’s initial organizational structure and operational approach entering 
Iraq in 2003 reflected the traditional military concept of a command, a choice that 
degraded the efficacy of the U.S. counterterrorism response. Eventually recognizing the 
rigidity of the hierarchical command structure and its ineffectiveness against an evolving 
threat, USSOCOM adopted a counterterrorism leadership role less reliant on centralized 
authority. A more effective counterterrorism response followed.30 
The concept of command plays an integral role in the conduct of traditional 
military operations. Military workplaces depict the chain of command in an array of 
photos from the President down to the lowest unit level. Assumption of command 
ceremonies honor the transfer of authority from outgoing to incoming unit commanders. 
Briefings routinely include block-and-line organizational charts explicitly depicting 
command relationships and the level of authority—such as operational, administrative, or 
tactical control—one commander holds over another. 
                                                 
28 Stanley A. McChrystal, My Share of the Task: A Memoir (New York, NY: Portfolio/Penguin, 
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Military vernacular and joint doctrine use the term in three distinct forms: the 
lawful exercise of authority over subordinates, an issued order to create specific action, 
and an organizational structure under the leadership of a single individual.31 Military 
operations fold these three concepts into the practice of unity of command, elevated as 
one of the nine principals of war and stressing “all forces operate under a single 
commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a 
common purpose.”32 This vertical centralization of control for decision making and the 
rigid hierarchical structure it produces are characteristics of what business management 
theorist, Henry Mintzberg labels “the machine bureaucracy.”33 Mintzberg asserts that 
machine bureaucracies seek to regulate decision making and information flow more so 
than any other organizational structure: “All of this suggests that the Machine 
Bureaucracy is a structure with an obsession, namely control. A control mentality 
pervades it from top to bottom.”34 
General McChrystal acknowledged the military’s reliance on highly formalized 
command structures in early counterterrorism operations, comparing the initial 
organizational design of special operations counterterrorism units to the top-down, 
reductionist management approach of Frederick Winslow Taylor: 
a combination of specialized vertical columns (departments or divisions) 
and horizontal tiers that denote levels of authority, with the most powerful 
literally on top—the only tier that can access all columns. At the top, we 
envision the strategic decision making. At the bottom, we imagine action 
by those taking direction. The efficiency, strength, and logic that we are 
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inclined to see in such a chart is a natural extension of the separation of 
planning from execution.35 
By 2004, however, a lack of genuine progress in countering AQI spurred leaders 
to question the effectiveness of the hierarchical structure.36 
This ineffectiveness did not stem from an incomplete application of unity of 
command. It is true that counterterrorism in Iraq involved numerous intergovernmental 
players from dozens of countries and that no single entity led the entirety of that effort. 
Various organizations coordinated interagency and multinational contributions within 
specific functional areas, but no leader held the unitary command authority over all 
diplomatic, military, intelligence, and law enforcement entities.37 However, rather than a 
mistake, this division of authority was by design, ensuring the integrity of civilian 
leadership “while unity of command and the exercise of command and control (C2) apply 
strictly to military forces and operations.”38 Furthermore, the civilian-military command 
relationship remained unchanged from 2004 to 2008—when an effective 
counterterrorism response had been generated—demonstrating that unity of command 
across interorganizational entities is an unnecessary condition for success. 
Instead, the early breakdown in countering terrorism in Iraq resulted in part from 
the inability of the rigid hierarchical structure to promote a unity of effort. Military 
doctrine even acknowledges the importance of unified effort in operations where the 
commander may not control all civilian interagency or multinational partners,39 but the 
structural design of early counterterrorism efforts in Iraq worked directly against that end. 
The machine bureaucracy promotes process standardization and functional 
grouping, with the centralized leadership structure orchestrating how subordinate groups 
contribute to the final output. To promote efficiency, work groups develop a high degree 
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of specialization, which in turn produces a sense of purpose limited in scope to that 
team’s responsibilities. For example, a factory worker assigned to the wheel casting 
department—and connected to other departments in the production process only through 
a direct supervisor—comes to associate her purpose with casting wheels, as opposed to 
contributing to the larger purpose of producing a car. Mintzberg warns, however, that this 
design thrives only “in environments that are simple and stable,” where the inputs and 
expected outputs of the organization remain relatively unchanged:40 
So a fundamental dilemma faces the top managers of the Machine 
Bureaucracy as a result of the centralization of the structure and the 
emphasis on reporting through the chain of authority. In times of change, 
when they most need to spend time getting the “tangible detail,” they are 
overburdened with decisions coming up the hierarchy for resolution. They 
are, therefore, reduced to acting superficially, with inadequate, abstract 
information.41 
Simple and stable do not accurately characterize counterterrorism in 2003 Iraq. 
Viewing counterterrorism as a process, changes in the input—methods of attack, popular 
support, mediums of communication—necessitated changes in the output or organizational 
response—counterterrorism. However, the rigid hierarchical structure prevented a unity of 
effort across counterterrorism contributors, in turn preventing the adaptability necessary to 
meet the threat. Both military and civilian contributing organizations demonstrated a high 
level of proficiency, but lacked a shared sense of collective purpose. Even within special 
operations elements, this lack of unity showed: 
On its own, each team exhibited horizontal bonds of trust and a common 
sense of purpose, but the only external ties that mattered to each team ran 
vertically, connecting it to the command superstructure, just like workers 
on an assembly line. Meaningful relationships between teams were 
nonexistent. And our teams had very provincial definitions of purpose: 
completing a mission or finishing intel analysis, rather than defeating AQI 
[Al Qaeda in Iraq]. To each unit, the piece of the war that really mattered 
was the piece inside their box on the org chart; they were fighting their 
own fights in their own silos. The specialization that allowed for 
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breathtaking efficiency became a liability in the face of the 
unpredictability of the real world.42 
The first critical step in correcting the limiting effect of the rigid hierarchical 
structure in countering terrorism did not come in the form of a new action, but rather the 
acceptance of a new reality—comfort as a participant without command authority. This 
acknowledgement did not cause better interagency and multinational integration, but it 
was necessary to enable that process. By letting go of the deep-seated cultural tendency 
to maintain centralized control within a clearly defined organizational structure, special 
operations made room for adopting a unified counterterrorism response, a task requiring a 
second, more deliberate approach to integration. 
2. Target-Focused Collaboration 
Counterterrorism leaders replaced the inflexible command-centric structure of 
2003 with an approach based on interorganizational collaboration, what General 
McChrystal termed a “team of teams”43 design for waging “collaborative warfare.”44 
Rather than emphasizing collaboration as a part of the counterterrorism process, 
collaboration became the primary vehicle enabling the process. Special operations leaders 
replaced previous linkages between organizations based on formal command and 
communication lines with more productive, trust-based relationships to achieve a 
common purpose.45 
An abundance of literature on the topic over the last two decades suggests it has 
become axiomatic that counterterrorism necessitates collaboration between 
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contributors.46 Rather than providing another detailed recount of interorganizational 
collaboration within counterterrorism, this section will focus on two, more specific 
observations. 
The first highlights the importance of a properly scoped, unifying objective 
around which to collaborate. 
USSOCOM pioneered neither the idea nor the practice of fostering a unity of 
effort through increased interorganizational cooperation. It is more likely that the 
counterterrorism evolution in Iraq succeeded by building on previous wisdom and 
experience. In 1996, DOD dedicated an entire doctrinal publication to interorganizational 
coordination during military operations, emphasizing the very concepts operationalized in 
Iraq and even warning against approaching such efforts with a traditional military 
command and control mindset.47 Some have offered Joint Interagency Task Force-South 
as the “gold standard” of cross-organizational collaboration, drawing its roots from 
counterdrug operations in Latin America beginning in the 1980s.48 USSOCOM also 
relied on the integration with interorganizational partners including multilateral forces, 
law enforcement agencies, and the intelligence community in Somalia (1993), Haiti 
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(1994), Balkans (1995-2001), Philippines (2001), Afghanistan (2001-present), and Horn 
of Africa (2002).49 
Rather than representing an original concept or practice, the counterterrorism 
response in Iraq set itself apart from previous operations by the scale at which 
interorganizational collaboration occurred. The number and variety of actors participating 
in counterterrorism in Iraq represents the largest collaboration effort led by USSOCOM 
since its activation in 1987. The military component alone included deployed forces from 
thirty-seven countries, supported indirectly by more than twenty others. Many of these 
countries also contributed in nonmilitary capacities, providing diplomatic officers, 
intelligence analysts and collectors, law enforcement experts, and civil development 
advisors.50 
However, the unprecedented size of the task often overshadows the reality that 
interorganizational collaboration in Iraq occurred within a relatively narrow scope, aimed 
at achieving a single task—defeating the AQI network, not defeating terrorism writ 
large.51 Establishing an effective unity of effort required identifying a manageable 
objective around which all contributors could unify. 
Attempting to form a collaborative counterterrorism network beginning at the top 
would have met significant resistance owing to the sheer size of the participant pool. A 
2010 study by The Washington Post found 1,271 government entities and 1,931 private 
contractors contributing to counterterrorism from the U.S. alone.52 Similarly, 
USSOCOM’s reference manual for interagency counterterrorism operations identifies 
636 significant players by name, but includes a disclaimer emphasizing that continuous 
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changes and additions make any list or organizational chart capturing the entire structure 
out of date at the time of print: “A comprehensive list would be more confusing than 
helpful; it would also never be completely accurate.”53 Improving interagency 
collaboration to defend against terrorism more broadly certainly represented a leading 
national policy goal at the time.54 But, previous failed attempts—even under presidential 
direction—suggest attempting to revamp the entire national system at once would not 
lead to effective collaboration.55 (Taking Stock, 39–40) 
Instead, USSOCOM bit off a more manageable portion of the elephant, 
collaborating with interorganizational partners to target AQI specifically. The fruits of 
focusing collaborative efforts narrowly around defeating AQI began to emerge by 
2006.56 A Washington Post report recalled government agencies beginning to leave their 
organizational silos to participate in a more concerted effort, unified by the solitary goal 
of dismantling the AQI network: 
the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] provides intelligence analysts and 
spycraft with sensors and cameras that can track targets, vehicles or 
equipment for up to 14 hours. FBI forensic experts dissect data, from 
cellphone information to the “pocket litter” found on extremists. Treasury 
officials track funds flowing among extremists and from governments. 
National Security Agency staffers intercept conversations or computer 
data, and members of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency use 
high-tech equipment to pinpoint where suspected extremists are using 
phones or computers.57 
Secondly, USSOCOM played a unique role in this collaboration effort. General 
McChrystal acknowledged the dichotomy of the command’s position: “We needed to 
bind everybody into a single enterprise, but we had no explicit authority to do so.”58 
                                                 
53 Joint Special Operations University, Special Operations Forces Interagency Counterterrorism 
Reference Manual, A-1-17. 
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Pursuant its 2003 charge from the Secretary of Defense, USSOCOM held primacy for 
synchronizing military counterterrorism planning, but it did not command the entirety of 
the interorganizational response.59 Instead, special operations—both at the command and 
tactical unit level—served as active participants in the larger USG construct. In addition 
to the military, numerous other government organizations had been applying their unique, 
and often exquisite, organizational capabilities to counterterrorism for years. Rather than 
attempting to assert hegemony throughout the mission space, USSOCOM “accelerated 
action.” Special operations forces use the colloquial expression, accelerating action, to 
describe a common practice of adding value to an ongoing effort or operation by 
integrating special operations into the existing construct formed by prior contributors, 
their actions, and their relationships to one another. 
Moreover, by building trust-based relationships with other contributing members 
and providing venues to foster those relationships, special operations came to represent a 
counterterrorism network hub, or a connector.60 Journalist Malcolm Gladwell asserts 
connectors routinely cross social, cultural, and organizational boundaries to associate 
with an uncommon number and variety of people: “They are the kinds of people who 
know everyone.”61 USSOCOM certainly did not stumble into this role, however. Senior 
special operations commanders directed its ranks to form the network’s mortar, viewing 
collaboration and connectivity as inseparable: 
We didn’t need every member of the Task Force to know everyone else; 
we just needed everyone to know someone on every team, so that when 
they thought about, or had to work with, the unit that bunked next door or 
their intelligence counterparts in D.C., they envisioned a friendly face 
rather than a competitive rival… We needed to enable a team operating in 
an interdependent environment to understand the butterfly-effect 
ramifications of their work and make them aware of the other teams with 
                                                 
59 U.S. Special Operations Command History and Research Office, United States Special Operations 
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whom they would have to cooperate in order to achieve strategic—not just 
tactical—success.62 
Realizing this goal required considerable effort, which USSOCOM consumed. 
Operations centers provided physical space for interagency partners to interact with one 
another daily. “Institutionalized ambassadors,” or liaison officers, “deployed” throughout 
theater and Washington, DC to solidify relationships with the intelligence community, 
law enforcement, the diplomatic corps, and even the Joint Chiefs of Staff.63 To build 
trust, special operations commands shared information with interagency counterparts at 
an unprecedented level— “our standing guidance was ‘share information until you’re 
afraid it’s illegal.’”64 
Ultimately, special operations’ role as a connector directly contributed to a more 
integrated, collaborative counterterrorism construct. An organizational chart from a 2010 
study (Figure 2) illustrates how the counterterrorism response evolved into an 
interconnected network of teams, largely agnostic to organizational boundaries and 
formal hierarchical structure. 
                                                 
62 McChrystal et al., Team of Teams, 129–30. 
63 Ibid., chap. 9. 
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Figure 2.  Counterterrorism through Networked, Interagency Collaboration65 
3. Causal Effects
These two contributions—comfort without command and interorganizational 
collaboration around a unified objective—had at least three important effects on terrorism 
response. 
First, the counterterrorism apparatus in Iraq became more adaptable.66 The ability 
to respond appropriately to change in an adversary and the operating environment holds 
obvious utility in any conflict, however, the speed of change in terrorism necessitates an 
uncommon level of adaptability. Modern terrorist networks typically maintain an 
advantage in this respect, unburdened by bureaucratic and legal constraints, rigid 
65 Source: Dana Priest and William M. Arkin, Top Secret America: The Rise of the New American 
Security State, 1st ed (New York, NY: Little, Brown and Co, 2011), 136. 
66 McChrystal et al., Team of Teams, 219. 
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authority structures, and time-consuming decision cycles.67 Much of the effort of 
counterterrorism, therefore, focuses on minimizing that comparative advantage by 
improving the adaptability of the response. Flattening the structure of the 
counterterrorism network in Iraq led to faster communications, sense-making of the 
threat, and decision-making—collectively contributing to a more agile response. 
By extension of the first effect, USSOCOM’s organizational changes contributed 
to a more resilient counterterrorism network in Iraq. Where adaptability ensures a 
competitive organizational response to change more broadly, an organization’s resilience 
measures its ability to respond appropriately to damage. 
The resilience developed by the counterterrorism network in Iraq differs, 
however, from the organizational resilience encouraged by disaster and crisis 
management literature which emphasizes “the capacity to cope with unanticipated 
dangers after they have become manifest, learning to bounce back.”68 For example, high 
reliability organizations such as air traffic control systems for commercial aviation and 
nuclear power generation plants focus on the maintenance of their system’s minimal, 
essential functions in the face of damage, followed by rapid recovery and the 
institutionalization of new lessons into future practices.69 Similarly, many government 
institutions and civilian companies have restructured their organizations to be more 
resilient to a terrorist attack, emphasizing above all returning “to previous levels of 
functioning relatively quickly.”70 
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The counterterrorism network went beyond simply surviving and learning from 
mistakes. Counterterrorism leaders came to “accept the reality that they will inevitably 
confront unpredicted threats” and then formed the network “to roll with the punches, or 
even benefit from them.”71 Emerging threats became opportunities to gain comparative 
advantage, similar to the way the human body adapts to attacks. 
Professor Dennis Coyle explains how detoxification by enzymes and immune cell 
activity represent a more progressive form of resiliency than mere survival, one resulting 
in incremental improvement through each iteration of threat and response.72 When a 
harmful substrate enters the body, for example, enzymes render the substance harmless 
and often turn the threat into useful material that the body then employs: “through a 
complex network of anticipatory and resilient mechanisms—more the latter than the 
former—they make possible, however briefly, vigorous life amidst inevitable danger.”73 
Within the counterterrorism network, there also seems to be a correlation between 
the organization’s adaptability, resilience, and risk tolerance. Seeking innovative ways to 
influence the terrorist network, commanders often entertained unproven ideas and 
methods, inherently leading to an increase in the risk or even realization of mistakes. 
Resilience allowed the counterterrorism network to minimize the effect of those failures. 
But, in addition to occasional mistakes, those risks often revealed new opportunities, 
some of which translated into better practices. The result is a virtuous cycle leading 
towards increased efficacy—organizational resiliency allows the network to assume more 
risk; entrepreneurial action creates mistakes and innovation; successes from innovation 
contribute to a more adaptive and resilient network. 
Lastly, the organizational and operational changes made by the counterterrorism 
network led to a marked increase in inefficiency. This should come as no surprise since 
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efficiency represents a central goal of bureaucracies,74 and deconstructing the 
hierarchical bureaucratic structure was the first major move in forming a more effective 
response to AQI. General McChrystal recognized the natural tension between 
inefficiency and the reductionist bureaucratic model: “Anyone who wanted to beat us at a 
game of bureaucratic politics would have all the ammunition they needed, but that wasn’t 
the fight we were focused on.”75 Countering terrorism more effectively necessitated 
adaptability. Inefficiency was an unavoidable byproduct of that transformation: 
Where org charts are tidy…teams are messy. Connections crisscross all 
over the place, and there is lots of overlap: team members track and travel 
through not only their own specialized territory but often the entire 
playing field. Trust and purpose are inefficient: getting to know your 
colleagues intimately and acquiring a whole-system overview are big time 
sinks; the sharing of responsibilities generates redundancy. But this 
overlap and redundancy—these inefficiencies—are precisely what imbues 
teams with high-level adaptability and efficacy. Great teams are less like 
“awesome machines” than awesome organisms.76 
The duplication of efforts and overlapping responsibilities stood in direct defiance 
to the neatly partitioned, highly specialized silos of the 2003 counterterrorism command 
structure. Recent statements before Congress by senior military leaders illustrate how, 
even today, USSOCOM maintains the networked organizational design it honed in its 
early counterterrorism role. 
In combatting terrorists, special operations forces have built flat networks 
that bridge interagency divides down to the tactical level. Inherently joint, 
our special operations warfighters have continued to support global U.S. 
Government objectives by leveraging critical interagency and international 
partnerships. These boundary-spanning networks minimize our tactical 
response time while radically accelerating innovation.77 
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III. CWMD THROUGH THE COUNTERTERRORISM LENS 
A. DEMYSTIFYING PROLIFERATION LANGUAGE 
But, for all that, I cannot but be of opinion, that, translating out of one 
language into another… is like setting to view the wrong side of a piece of 
tapestry, where, though the figures are seen, they are full of ends and 
threads, which obscure them, and are not seen with the smoothness and 
evenness of the right side.1 
—Don Quixote de la Mancha 
Participating in an interagency WMD working group can often resemble a United 
Nations symposium, where much is said, but subtle nuances are lost in translation. Like 
terrorism, the proliferation challenge has summoned a language all its own, with unique 
dialects forming within contributing government agencies. USSOCOM also finds itself in 
a familiar position, redefining its role in an already mature mission-space, but charged 
with planning and coordinating a more effective military contribution to an evolving 
threat. Using counterterrorism as a point of comparison, any attempt at overcoming 
organizational language barriers first requires establishing a clear picture of the words 
and phrases already in use to describe WMD proliferation. 
While admittedly a more modern construct than terrorism, WMD proliferation 
does not represent a new idea. Credited with one of the earliest uses of the phrase, 
Archbishop of Canterbury, William Cosmo Gordon Lang referred to weapons of mass 
destruction during a Christmas address in 1937.2 
Take, for example, the question of peace. Who can think without dismay 
of the fears, jealousies, and suspicions which have compelled nations, our 
own among them, to pile up their armaments? Who can think at this 
present time without a sickening of the heart of the appalling slaughter, the 
suffering, the manifold misery brought by war to Spain and to China? 
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Who can think without horror of what another widespread war would 
mean, waged as it would be with all the new weapons of mass 
destruction?3 
The Archbishop offered no clear definition of the term during his speech; 
however, its use in this context did not refer to WMD as understood today, and W. Seth 
Carus posits “there is no reason to believe that subsequent uses resulted from the 
Archbishop’s address.”4 
The modern understanding of WMD originated instead during a joint declaration 
by the U.S., the United Kingdom, and Canada on November 15, 1945.5 The United 
Nations Commission on Conventional Armaments further codified the term in a 
resolution released on August 12, 1948: 
The Commission for Conventional Armaments resolves to advise the 
Security Council: 1. that it considers that all armaments and armed forces, 
except atomic weapons and weapons of mass destruction, fall within its 
jurisdiction, and that weapons of mass destruction should be defined to 
include atomic explosive weapons, radio-active material weapons, lethal 
chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the 
future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those 
of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above.6 
After nearly eight decades of use in various forms, some critics argue that WMD 
remains poorly defined and widely misunderstood, even within the U.S. government. 
However, despite common misusage and conflation of related terms among media outlets 
and occasionally academic circles, Carus argues that an authoritative, internationally 
accepted definition of WMD does currently exist. “The term is integral to the 
international community’s long-standing disarmament dialogue,” posits Carus, who 
provides a detailed history of WMD’s diplomatic origins, associated treaties, and 
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alternative uses.7 This study accepts Carus’ position and uses the definition common to 
international policy circles and codified in military doctrine: “Weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) are chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons or devices 
capable of a high order of destruction and/or causing mass casualties.”8 
Despite relative consensus in meaning, WMD as a typological construct still 
presents several problems within the USG. For example, merging four unique threat 
streams—chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear—produces an enormous and 
complex mission space. Chemical barrel bombs in Syria necessitate an entirely different 
response than a Russian biological weapons program. The threat of radiological attacks 
by violent extremists differs significantly from North Korean nuclear development. 
Generating policies and strategies to respond to such an immense, complex idea naturally 
leads to friction within the bureaucracy to include stove-piping and authority overlap. 
Some participants even choose to deviate from the accepted definition by design, 
interpreting the problem through their respective organizational lens. 
The FBI, for example, holds a more inclusive definition of WMD based on U.S. 
law. The Bureau accepts chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear in its definition 
of WMD. But, it expands beyond those to include bombs, grenades, and rockets “having 
an explosive or incendiary charge of more than four ounces” and missiles “having an 
explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce.”9 Adopting a broader 
definition enables the FBI to prosecute threats that other agencies would not classify as 
WMD related, including the use of rocket-propelled grenades and vehicle-borne 
improvised explosive devices.10 The FBI does not expect other agencies to accept its 
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interpretation of WMD, but instead draws on language to generate a more effective 
federal law enforcement response. 
However, though the object of discussion may be widely accepted (WMD), how 
the U.S. government describes efforts to affect change on that object can blur in a 
misunderstanding of three common expressions: nonproliferation, counterproliferation, 
and CWMD. 
Understanding nonproliferation and counterproliferation requires clearly defining 
their root. Accepted definitions of proliferation originate primarily from historical 
diplomatic usage, the United Nations (UN) 1947 Commission on Conventional 
Armaments, and various international treaties relating to WMD.11 However, an 
interagency study directed by Congressional mandate in the 1994 Defense Authorization 
Act synthesized previous terminology more succinctly: “Proliferation refers to the spread 
of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.”12 
The report expounded that nonproliferation encompasses “the full range of 
political, economic and military tools to prevent proliferation, reverse it diplomatically or 
protect our interests against an opponent armed with weapons of mass destruction.”13 
Common nonproliferation efforts include diplomatic engagement, international treaties, 
import and export controls, and disarmament assistance.14 The more widely accepted 
contemporary usage of nonproliferation can be found in current DOD doctrine, which 
emphasizes preclusion and omits efforts to “reverse” proliferation where it has already 
manifested: “actions to prevent the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by 
dissuading or impeding access to, or distribution of, sensitive technologies, material, and 
                                                 
11 Carus, “Defining ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction,’” 6–24. 
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expertise.”15 However, as stressed in the 1994 DOD report—and consistent with 
diplomatic, UN, and treaty handling of the term—nonproliferation emphasizes prevention 
as its central tenant. 
In contrast, counterproliferation holds a strong connotation of active intervention. 
DOD joint doctrine defines counterproliferation as “those actions taken to reduce the 
risks posed by extant weapons of mass destruction to the United States, allies, and 
partners.”16 As with nonproliferation, counterproliferation extends across “the full range 
of U.S. efforts,”17 but shifts focus from potential and emerging proliferation cases to 
“extent” threats, or problem-sets that have already materialized.18 The differentiation 
between nonproliferation and counterproliferation can be clarified through international 
relations theorist, Thomas Schelling’s delineation of deterrence and compellence.19 The 
prevention of an act (deterring proliferation) characterizes nonproliferation; the 
discontinuation of an act (compelling the reversal of proliferation) best characterizes 
counterproliferation. term CWMD  
In 2002, national strategy documents added the phrase “combatting weapons of 
mass destruction” to the proliferation discourse.20 In its original form, “the U.S. approach 
to combat WMD” simply referred to the aggregation of the “pillars of our national 
strategy”—nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management.21 The 
2006 National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction expanded on the 
military’s role within those pillars, but it also referred to CWMD as a more unified, 
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singular activity.22 For example, the 2006 document outlines that the purpose of the 
strategy “is to provide DOD Components guidance and a strategic framework for 
combatting WMD,” as opposed to guidance along the three existing lines of effort.23 It is 
unclear if DOD intended CWMD to take on a more singular meaning in the 2006 strategy, 
or if the term was only offered as a way to succinctly refer to the entire mission space. 
However, the document does represent the first authoritative use of the acronym CWMD 
and set a precedence for degrading the clarity of the pillar construct. 
Military strategy documents later replaced the terms combat and combatting 
(championed by the 2001 presidential administration) with the term countering weapons of 
mass destruction, which remains in use today.24 In its current form, military doctrine 
provides the following definition for CWMD: “Efforts against actors of concern to curtail 
the conceptualization, development, possession, proliferation, use, and effects of weapons 
of mass destruction, related expertise, materials, technologies, and means of delivery.”25 
Of importance, the 2014 DOD Strategy for CWMD deviated from the pattern up 
to that point by excluding references to the proliferation pillars and their relationship to 
the concept of CWMD.26 
Rather than dividing WMD proliferation response along the traditional pillars, 
CWMD is articulated through the U.S. military construct of ends, ways, and means: 
“DOD will seek to achieve the End States, targeting the Priority Objectives via the 
Strategic Approach (Ways), all of which are supported by Countering WMD Activities 
and Tasks (Means).”27 The 2014 military strategy document depicts the relationship 
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between these three concepts as a continuous cycle (Figure 3) “carried out simultaneously 
against a diverse group of actors of concern at all stages of proliferation.”28 
 
Figure 3.  CWMD Ends, Ways, and Means as Depicted in Military Doctrine.29 
The strategic approach for conducting CWMD can then be described as the 
combination of three lines of effort, or ways: “prevent acquisition, contain and reduce 
threats, and respond to crisis.”30 The three end states from military doctrine— “no new 
possession, no WMD use, and minimize effects”—clearly correspond to the goals of the 
three proliferation pillars, but do not necessarily correspond with how to achieve them 
(the ways).31 
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However, though the military abandoned the pillar construct, the remainder of the 
USG did not. A survey of seven principal government departments that contribute to the 
proliferation threat reveals that six departments use the term counterproliferation in their 
mission statements and organizational charts; only DOD consistently uses the term 
CWMD.32 As a result—and not originally intended as such—the term CWMD has 
become synonymous with U.S. military efforts to affect the WMD proliferation threat. 
This organizational mismatch in labeling has led to some confusion and tension within 
interagency working groups focused on addressing WMD proliferation.33 
Yet, detailed analysis of CWMD and the proliferation pillars suggest the 
differences in the constructs are relatively minor and can be reduced to two deviations. 
First, CWMD refers to a mission space that includes nonproliferation, 
counterproliferation, consequence management, and nothing else. This should come as no 
surprise, since the concept of CWMD originally referred to the combination of the three 
pillars. But, this relationship has led to confusion even in recent proliferation working 
groups. In fact, both CWMD and the proliferation pillars draw their direction and 
authority from the same three national policies: no new WMD acquisition or 
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development, no WMD use, and minimize the effects of WMD use.34 This relationship is 
best understood by viewing CWMD and the pillars as responses to a WMD threat 
pathway, or portions of that response. WMD threat pathways are often sophisticated 
networks “encompassing ideas, materials, technologies, facilities, processes, products, 
and events that enable actors to conceptualize, develop, possess, and proliferate WMD 
and related capabilities.”35 Reduced to its fundamental parts, however, a successful 
proliferation pathway begins with the intent to acquire or develop a WMD, followed by 
proliferation, and concludes with use. Therefore, from the perspective of requisite 
response to that pathway, both CWMD and the proliferation pillars (when combined) 
occupy the same mission space, beginning with intent and ending with the consequences 
of the WMD use managed. 
However, though the two constructs share the same start and finish, it would be 
misleading to view CWMD as a summation of the proliferation pillars: 
 
CWMD ≠ Nonproliferation + Counterproliferation + Consequence Management 
 
This formula inaccurately depicts the relationship between CWMD and the pillars 
due to typological differences in how the two constructs bin lines of effort within the 
mission space—specifically in the demarcation between counterproliferation and 
consequence management. 
Within the U.S. interagency, the categorization of efforts—how activities to 
influence WMD proliferation are grouped—corresponds with the pillars themselves. For 
example, if an agency describes an action as a nonproliferation activity, it would signal 
that activity supports the policy of no new WMD acquisition and occurs on the threat 
pathway bounded by two specific limits: intent and proliferation. In this case, CWMD 
                                                 
34 U.S. National Security Council, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction; 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass 
Destruction. 
35 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (Joint Publication 
3–40), 18. 
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offers an identical line of effort, binned with the same limits as nonproliferation, only by 
a different label, “prevent acquisition.” Therefore, so long as the players involved 
understand that “nonproliferation” and “prevent acquisition” hold the same meaning to 
describe a specific category of activities, the terms could be used interchangeably without 
risk of miscommunication. 
 But, this equivalency of terms breaks down in describing efforts after WMD 
acquisition. Both CWMD and the column construct divide the remainder of the response 
into two lines of effort. These typologies vary in where to draw the dividing line between 
the two categories (Figure 4). Counterproliferation begins with acquisition and ends with 
WMD use; consequence management begins where counterproliferation leaves off and 
ends once the effects of WMD use have been managed. In contrast, the emergence of a 
WMD crisis separates lines of effort in the CWMD construct, marking the end of 
“contain and reduce threats” and the start of “respond to crisis.” 
 
Figure 4.  Overlay of WMD Pathway, Proliferation Pillars, and CWMD.36 
                                                 
36 Adapted from DOD Joint Publication 3–40, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of 
Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, 12–13. 
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Unlike nonproliferation, counterproliferation cannot be used interchangeably to 
describe the military’s line of effort to contain and reduce threats. Likewise, 
consequence management and respond to crisis do not describe the same category of 
efforts. 
If organizations fail to understand these typological differences, there may be a 
tendency to conflate the proliferation pillars with CWMD lines of effort. CWMD uses 
three lines of effort; the proliferation pillars use three lines of effort. But, viewing 
CWMD simply as a summation of nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and 
consequence management ignores the variation in language between the two constructs, 
potentially contributing to organizational friction in the form of miscommunication or 
competing realities. 
For example, military doctrine provides a chart listing notional tasks and typical 
operations that might be performed within each CWMD line of effort (Figure 5).37 Now, 
imagine for a moment a U.S. government agency conflates counterproliferation with the 
CWMD line of effort “contain and reduce threats.” Based on their understanding of the 
typology, that agency would expect to find only tasks appropriate to counterproliferation 
within that line of effort. Indeed, the military chart includes typical counterproliferation 
tasks within “contain and reduce threats”—such as targeting, interdiction, and unified 
action.38 That agency would also expect that counterproliferation tasks not appear in any 
other line of effort. Yet, the same three counterproliferation tasks also appear within the 
third CWMD line of effort, “respond to crisis.”39 
                                                 






Figure 5.  Notional DOD Tasks Categorized by CWMD Lines of Effort.40 
Clearly defined terms and delineation of relationships between the terms 
discussed above provide a framework for concise discussion of the problem set. 
Proliferation is the international reality that weapons of mass destruction continue to 
spread if unimpeded. Nonproliferation and counterproliferation represent national 
policies, though both are often used to describe strategies or efforts in support of those 
policies. Countering weapons of mass destruction refers to strategies and efforts across 
the entire spectrum of a WMD threat pathway, but is a term used almost exclusively by 
the U.S. military and varies slightly from the proliferation column typology. 
Given the significant friction over WMD language, some suggest DOD should 
abandon CWMD terminology and adopt—or revert back to—the more widely accepted 
proliferation pillars. Doing so would theoretically lead to consensus throughout the USG, 
aligned with the language used by the national command authority. 
Wouldn’t it be good if DOD would organize itself the way the President 
organized his cabinet? If you went up to the White House and looked for an 
office labeled CWMD, you wouldn’t find it. Instead, you would find offices 
                                                 
40 Adapted from DOD Joint Publication 3–40, Ibid. 
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that are issue-specific, such as NP [nonproliferation] or CP 
[counterproliferation]… There is no CWMD policy coordination committee 
[PCC] for example... I would push to get the language more consistent with 
whatever the White house directs are the topics of the PCCs.41 
However, senior research fellow Brendan Melley goes on to highlight that a 
sudden, whole-sale substitution of language “would break a lot of china in the 
Department of Defense.”42 
In contrast, USSOCOM’s handling of counterterrorism language offers a more 
measured approach to overcoming organizational friction. As outlined in Chapter II, 
USSOCOM first educated itself on the language already in use by other government 
entities and then highlighted AQI as the shared calibration point around which to 
collaborate. Applying this model to CWMD provides a practical solution to overcoming 
disparate organizational language. 
Dr. Robyn Klein, for example, emphasizes the importance of participants building 
awareness of CWMD language and the organizations that reflect those understandings: 
“While a common lexicon certainly would be helpful, the most important requirement is 
a common understanding regarding the extent of the mission space and the different 
roles, responsibilities, authorities, and tools that are, can, and should be applied to the 
different problem sets within it.”43 
Some evidence suggests USSOCOM has already begun applying lessons from the 
counterterrorism model to the CWMD language challenge. USSOCOM leaders have 
advocated that planners and intelligence officers “understand the differences in 
terminology” in order to properly integrate military contributions into other USG efforts 
to counter WMD threats.44 
                                                 
41 Brendan Melley (Senior Research Fellow, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
National Defense University), in discussion with the author, May 9, 2017. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Emphasis added. Robyn Klein (Director, WMD Terrorism Threats, The White House National 
Security Council), in discussion with the author. 
44 Robert D. Foster, Jr. (Pathway Defeat Strategic Planner, USSOCOM J53 Special Plans & Policy), in 
discussion with the author. 
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B. CWMD ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN 
Assuming coordinating authority for CWMD allows USSOCOM to draw 
lessons learned from one fight (CT) and apply them to another (CWMD). 
While every fight is different, the global perspective and network 
approach USSOCOM brings to problem solving have the ability to support 
Geographic Combatant Commands and the Interagency in their 
responsibilities to counter WMD threats.45 
—Robert D. Foster, Jr., USSOCOM Special Plans and Policy 
Chapter II illustrates how USSOCOM drew two significant organizational design 
lessons from its role as the counterterrorism military synchronizer: comfort without 
command and target-focused collaboration. Based on the similarities between 
counterterrorism and CWMD, these lessons can—and should—be applied to CWMD and 
their value can be explored in more detail. Dr. Robyn Klein offers some context for the 
utility of seeking collaboration to achieve a unified objective within CWMD. 
Each department or agency at the federal level has unique roles, 
responsibilities, authorities, and processes that shapes its perspective, 
equities, and operations. Unity of command resides with the President and 
typically not with a single department or agency lead, which means our 
system requires that departments and agencies support a “unity of effort” 
model, both in steady state and during crisis. This is not unique to 
CWMD, but means that CWMD efforts across departments and agencies 
will always benefit from shared understanding of problems and close 
collaboration on the integrated sets of options to address them.46 
As with organizational language, USSOCOM CWMD planners have already 
acknowledged the pitfalls of approaching CWMD synchronization with the rigid 
hierarchical structure of a machine bureaucracy. In some ways, the organizational design 
lessons drawn from counterterrorism are already being applied to USSOCOM’s new 
CWMD role. 
For example, USSOCOM has made clear its role as military CWMD synchronizer 
does not equate to command authority in the mission space, but instead necessitates a 
                                                 
45 Ibid. 
46 Robyn Klein (Director, WMD Terrorism Threats, The White House National Security Council), in 
discussion with the author. 
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unity of effort—both within DOD and between interorganizational partners. “We are a 
surrogate, writing a plan for the department,” explains USSOCOM CWMD planners, 
highlighting the importance of clarity in the command’s assignment as the coordinating 
authority rather than command component or sole practitioner of military CWMD 
activities and plans.47 
Beyond integrating activities within the U.S. military, USSOCOM has also 
initiated deliberate efforts to better integrate DOD CWMD into broader USG efforts to 
counter WMD threats. Where military CWMD does not inherently denote special 
operations, it is equally true that CWMD is not the exclusive or even dominant 
responsibility of DOD. The military plays a role in the broader USG effort to counter 
WMD threats, but often serves as supporting cast to the myriad of other 
interorganizational entities routinely contributing to the non- and counterproliferation 
policy effort. Testifying before Congress in May 2017, USSOCOM Commander, General 
Raymond Thomas highlighted the command’s current focus to fold military contributions 
into ongoing interorganizational CWMD efforts: 
We are publishing a new Global Campaign Plan to provide a 
comprehensive, trans-regional approach which integrates ongoing regional 
and interagency efforts. We have also established a CWMD Coordination 
Center to design, execute and assess this new trans-regional approach and 
connect to other USG Departments and Agencies, as well as international 
partners. The Center leverages the resources and skills of multiple 
agencies that will result in a multi-layered comprehensive approach to 
address the CWMD problem set.48 
Comments by USSOCOM senior leaders at the 2017 DOD CWMD Global 
Synchronization Conference explained in more detail the intent of the Global Campaign 
Plan (GCP) referenced in General Thomas’ testimony. A single, concise statement 
                                                 
47 Robert D. Foster Jr., “Countering-WMD Joint Planning Group” (Presented at USSOCOM CWMD 
Table-Top Exercise, John Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab, Baltimore, MD, 2017). 
48 United States Special Operations Command: Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
4. 
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summarized the plan’s guiding principal: “The GCP is about unity of effort, not unity of 
command.”49 
USSOCOM is also emphasizing target-focused collaboration around WMD threat 
pathways, similar to counterterrorism collaboration efforts in 2003 based on defeating 
AQI. USSOCOM commanders and planners consistently offer specific WMD threat 
pathways as the starting point for collaboration in CWMD interagency working groups.50 
During a senior leader seminar at the 2017 DOD CWMD Global Synchronization 
Conference, USSOCOM presented “the pathway as a useful model to understand USG 
efforts to prevent the spread or use of WMD.”51 Rather than attempting to collaborate 
across the full breadth of the CWMD challenge at once, the forum underlined how the 
narrow scope and specificity of a WMD threat pathway helps interorganizational 
participants to “understand the activities, policies, authorities, or operations that can 
contribute” to a unified response.52 
                                                 
49 Emphasis added. U.S. Special Operations Command, “Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction: 
DOD’s Campaign Approach, Senior Leader Seminar” (presented at the DOD CWMD Global 
Synchronization Conference 17–1, Springfield, VA, 2017). 
50 Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Threat Reduction and Arms Control, 
“Opportunity Analysis 3”; Foster Jr., “Countering-WMD Joint Planning Group”; U.S. Special Operations 
Command, “Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD’s Campaign Approach, Senior Leader 
Seminar.” 
51 U.S. Special Operations Command, “Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD’s Campaign 




It would be hard to find a CWMD challenge that is not inherently an 
interagency problem requiring an interagency—and an international—
solution. Cooperation and collaboration across the interagency is integral 
to achieve these solutions… While the NSC [National Security Council] 
process often facilitates the development, coordination, and 
implementation of the President’s national security policy at the strategic 
level, it relies on departments and agencies working together 
independently on a day-to-day basis. In its new role, USSOCOM can help 
to increase this collaboration and focus interagency efforts on shared 
problems. 
—Director Robyn Klein, National Security Council1 
The spread and use of weapons of mass destruction threaten the U.S. and will 
likely persist as a substantial threat for the foreseeable future. The complex nature of that 
threat necessitates a collaborative, interorganizational response. USSOCOM holds an 
appropriate platform to influence the formation of a more effective, unified national 
approach to opposing WMD threats, based on the command’s new charge to synchronize 
U.S. military CWMD plans. 
Similarities between USSOCOM’s counterterrorism synchronization mission and 
its newly assigned CWMD role provide an opportunity to draw lessons from one problem 
to apply to another. 
However, misconceptions about what lessons might be carried over from 
counterterrorism persist throughout the USG. In large part, this is the result of 
misunderstanding the true causal mechanisms of USSOCOM’s counterterrorism 
successes. Some conflate the successful formation of an effective counterterrorism 
strategy with accelerated military kinetic operations to kill and capture terrorists. A closer 
look at SOCOM’s counterterrorism legacy tells a different story. 
This study illustrates that the maturation of a successful response to terrorism 
required USSOCOM and its interorganizational partners to change the way they 
                                                 
1 Robyn Klein (Director, WMD Terrorism Threats, The White House National Security Council), in 
discussion with the author. 
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communicated and organized. First, USSOCOM played a central role in overcoming 
disparate counterterrorism language by assessing how other organizations described the 
problem and then focusing collaborative efforts on a narrowly-scoped objective—initially 
defeating AQI, and then focused on other well defined targets. Second, USSOCOM 
contributed to two significant organizational design changes in the counterterrorism 
enterprise: 1) it embraced its role as a participant in the overall effort without clear 
command authority, and 2) it facilitated a collaborative interorganizational response 
unified around specific, identifiable, and achievable goals. 
A. WAY FORWARD 
USSOCOM’s handling of counterterrorism language and organizational design 
supports three recommendations for the command’s new role in synchronizing CWMD 
military plans. 
1. Learn the CWMD Language(s) Already in Use 
The majority of the international community and U.S. interagency describe their 
organizational roles along the three “proliferation pillars” (nonproliferation, 
counterproliferation, and consequence management), while DOD uses the construct 
CWMD. These two dialects share many commonalities, but a lack of mutual 
understanding has led to confusion and friction in CWMD interagency working groups. 
Education—within USSOCOM and among partners—is the first step in diffusing 
misunderstandings. USSOCOM liaison officers are well situated to advance this effort. 
2. Target-Focused Collaboration around WMD Threat Pathways 
Use specific WMD threat pathways as the calibration points to focus 
interorganizational collaboration. Consensus on CWMD language must start with a 
shared understanding of a clear objective. WMD threat pathways represent concrete, 
limited-scope objects around which agencies can collaborate effectively. Analysis of 
WMD pathway choke points and network nodes provides a common point of discussion 
along these lines. 
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3. Get the Word Out: Carrying over the “Right” Counterterrorism 
Lessons
USSOCOM is already applying lessons drawn from its role as the military 
counterterrorism synchronizer—comfort without command and unity of effort through 
collaboration—within its new CWMD role. USSOCOM leadership has taken steps to 
reassure interagency partners of the respect and value it places on their contributions, as 
well as USSOCOM’s limitations in the CWMD sphere. However, many interagency 
partners still conflate “USSOCOM counterterrorism lessons” with military kinetic 
targeting to defeat terrorist networks, rather than organizational changes to improve 
collaboration. The goal is to highlight USSOCOM’s CWMD efforts and amplify the “one 
team, one fight” message. 
B. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
With less than a year in its new role, some questions remain regarding 
USSOCOM’s charge to synchronize military CWMD plans. This study provides a 
starting point for carrying over lessons from counterterrorism such as clear language and 
organizational changes, but further research is necessary to address underexplored 
portions of the problem in more depth. During the course of this study, three specific 
questions emerged necessitating more analysis. 
What role should networks play in describing and understanding WMD threat 
pathways? During a senior leader seminar at the 2017 DOD CWMD Global 
Synchronization Conference, planners characterized networks as “the physical and virtual 
manifestation of pathways and supply technology, materials, and expertise to meet the 
demand of actors pursuing WMD programs and capabilities.”2 Chapter IV highlights 
USSOCOM’s current efforts to promote collaboration around WMD threat pathways, 
but, some interagency and international partners seem to have followed a similar pattern 
of target-focused collaboration oriented on networks rather than pathways. Focusing on 
2 U.S. Special Operations Command, “Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD’s Campaign 
Approach, Senior Leader Seminar.” 
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networks for collaboration may provide even greater focus and clarity than pathway 
targeting. 
What impact does organizational language have on collaboration with 
international organizations to prevent acquisition, development, and proliferation of 
WMDs? Theory and observations presented in this study emphasize the difficulty of 
communicating clearly and effectively within the U.S. government. These same hurdles 
likely exist in our relationships with international partners and competitors. 
How can USSOCOM contribute more effectively to the national strategy for 
consequence management of a WMD event (what DOD terms “CBRN response”)? 
Consequence management of a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack 
occurs under considerably different conditions than nonproliferation and 
counterproliferation. Properly synchronizing military plans for consequence management 
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